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IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF THE LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law's denial of a defense where the person acting illegally is either
ignorant of the law or has a mistaken belief as to its requirements' is deeply
rooted in our legal system. 2 Courts 3 and legislatures4 have created
exceptions to this general rule when the imposition of criminal liability for
acts undertaken in ignorance of the law or with a mistaken belief as to its
requirements seemed manifestly unjust, or where whatever justification
given for the rule by the jurisdiction was in some way mitigated or negated.
1. This proposition is expressed in a Latin maxim taking several forms
including "ignorantia juris non excusat" and "ignorantiajuris neminem excusat."
The term "ignorantia"encompasses both ignorance and mistake. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) 881-82.
2. See generally Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); ShelvinCarpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910). Edwin Keedy found the earliest
case treating the problem of ignorantia to have been decided in 1231. Keedy,
Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 78 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as Keedy]. The origins of the rule are discussed in Hall & Seligman,
Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 643-46 (1941) [hereinafter cited
as Hall & Seligman]; Keedy, supra at 78-81; Kohler, Ignorance or Mistake of Law as a
Defense in Criminal Cases, 40 DICK. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
Kohler]; Ryu & Silving, ErrorJuris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 421,
427-29 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Ryu & Silving].
3. Different courts have expressed different degrees of willingness to provide
exceptions to this general rule. In State v. Davis, 63 Wis. 2d 75, 216 N.W.2d 31 (1974),
the court allowed a mistake of law defense where a defendant relied in good faith
upon the opinion of a government counsel authorized by statute to give legal advice.
In Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456 (1949), on the other hand, no such
defense was allowed despite the fact that the state's attorney had advised the
defendant that his actions were legal. Davis might be distinguished from Hopkins in
that the state's attorney in Hopkins, unlike the government counsel in Davis, was not
authorized by statute to give the advice he gave.
Rollin Perkins points out that certain exceptions to the mistake of law
doctrine have evolved, including reliance upon a statute later found unconstitutional
or a court opinion subsequently overruled. He states that an ignorance or mistake of
law defense is recognized for a specific intent crime where that specific intent is
negated by the ignorance, as well as in some cases where some special mental element
of the crime other than intent is negated by the ignorance. In addition to these
exceptions, he suggests that reliance upon advice of counsel that a course of action is
legal should often be allowed as a defense to a criminal prosecution. See R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAw 925-35 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS]. An earlier version
of Perkin's chapter on ignorance and mistake was published as Perkins, Ignorance
and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1939).
4. Numerous states have created some statutory exception to the rule denying an
ignorance or mistake of law defense. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-504 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-6 (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-8 (SmithHurd 1972); KAN. STAT. § 21-3203 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.070(3) (Baldwin
1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.17 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §52 (1977
Pamphlet); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§94-2-103(3), 94-2-103(4) (Supp. 1977); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 15-20 (McKinney 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.03 (Vernon 1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.01.055 (1976 Supp.).
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Despite some attempts to rationalize and redefine the general rule in light of
these exceptions and in light of developing concepts of the purpose of
criminal punishment, 5 jurists have tended to cling to the existing rule and to
proffer justifications for those exceptions to its application that have
6
developed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard
arguments respecting the legitimacy of an ignorance or mistake of law
defense in appeals from the convictions of the Watergate and Ellsberg
burglars.7 The Watergate burglary involved an attempt to wiretap the office
of the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and the Ellsberg
burglary involved an attempt to secure records involving Daniel Ellsberg,
the man who released the Pentagon Papers, from the office of his
psychiatrist. Both operations were overseen by E. Howard Hunt, a
government official with a White House office, and may ultimately have
originated with the President of the United States. Basing their defenses
upon the apparently lofty positions of their superiors, the actual burglars
involved in the two break-ins argued that they should be excused from
criminal liability because they had reasonably relied upon the apparent
authority of those directing the two operations to authorize their actions. 8
5. See, e.g., Seney, "When Empty Terrors Overawe" - Our Criminal Law
Defenses, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1359 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Seney].
6. See notes 64 to 94 and accompanying text infra. Courts have sometimes
recognized a mistake of law defense where different but analogous mistake of law
defenses had previously been allowed, or in situations where the justification for not
allowing a defense seemed to fail. In similar situations other courts have imposed
criminal liability, simply noting the general rule denying a mistake of law defense
and that the given fact situation fit no existing exception to the rule. Compare State v.
Davis, 63 Wis. 2d 75, 216 N.W.2d 31 (1974), with Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d
456 (1949), discussed at note 3 supra.
7. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Barker 1] was an appeal by the actual burglars in the Watergate break-in; United
States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Barker II] was an
appeal by Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez from convictions that resulted
from their participation in the actual break-in into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist.
8. See generally Barker , 514 F.2d at 217; id. at 240-41 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting); id. at 248 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Barker II, 546 F.2d at 943-44 (Wilkey,
J., concurring); id. at 958-60 (Leventhal, J., dissenting); United States v. Ehrlichman,
546 F.2d 910, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The majority opinion in Barker I indicates that the defendants sincerely but
erroneously believed that the operation to bug Democratic National Headquarters was
a "national security" mission, authorized by a "government intelligence agency," to
examine alleged financial ties between the Democratic Party and the Castro regime.
514 F.2d at 211-12. The reasonableness of this belief is most strenuously argued in
Judge MacKinnon's dissent, id. at 240-41, 244, and is concisely stated by Judge
Wilkey in his dissent. The actual burglars were mere "foot soldiers" taking no part in
planning the break-in, and were only vaguely informed as to its purpose. Their willing
participation in the operation under these conditions was derived primarily from their
faith in E. Howard Hunt, a man they knew to be revered in Miami's Cuban-American
community for his active participation in the fight to liberate Cuba, and a man who
carried high White House and CIA credentials. The defendants had had long
experience with the CIA and on secret anti-Castro missions. This background had
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This issue was not reached by the majority in the Watergate case,
United States v. Barker9 [hereinafter Barker 1], for the court concluded that
taught them the importance of complete reliance on, and obedience to, their supervisor
in clandestine activities. Considering Hunt's background as known to the defendants,
as well as their own involvement in intelligence activities, the defendants had no
reason to doubt Hunt's assertion that he was part of a special intelligence unit, or to
question his authority to order clandestine operations for "national security" reasons.
The defendants "were accustomed to operate on a 'need-to-know' basis. It did not
occur to them to second-guess Hunt's decisions, let alone question his authority." Id.
at 248 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
The origins of the Ellsberg break-in are detailed in United States v.
Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Publication of the Pentagon Papers spurred
President Nixon to form a "special investigations" or "Room 16" unit within the
White House to investigate the theft of the papers and to prevent similar security
leaks in the future. Ehrlichman exercised general supervision over the unit, and Hunt,
a former CIA agent, was made a member. The principal enterprise of this unit seemed
to be the acquisition of all files and source material on Daniel Ellsberg, the man who
"leaked" the Pentagon Papers. A psychological profile on Ellsberg was requested
from the CIA. Because Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist, had refused to speak to
FBI representatives on this subject due to the confidential nature of the doctor-patient
relationship, Hunt suggested a "black bag job" to examine Dr. Fielding's file on
Ellsberg. This was approved, provided it could not be traced back to the White House,
and that no one employed by the White House effect the actual entry. Thus, Hunt
travelled to Miami in mid-August 1971 to enlist the aid of Barker, a man who had
worked under Hunt during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Id. at 915.
Hunt informed Barker that he was working at the White House in an
organization with greater jurisdiction than the FBI and the CIA, and asked Barker to
help conduct a surreptitious entry to obtain information important to national
security on "a traitor to this country who was passing ... classified information to
the Soviet Embassy," stating further that "the man in question ... was being
considered as a possible Soviet agent himself." Barker II, 546 F.2d at 943 (Wilkey, J.,
concurring). At this time Barker had previously been given an unlisted White House
number where he could reach Hunt, had received correspondence from Hunt written
on White House stationery, and had met Hunt in the Executive Office Building.
Barker agreed to help, and enlisted Felipe de Diego and Martinez, Barker having
conveyed to Martinez the information Hunt gave him. At trial both Barker and
Martinez testified that the failure of their alleged superior to show his credentials,
their failure to receive written orders, and the sparsity of information they received
about the project were all in conformity with the practices of the CIA that they had
observed in their prior association with that organization. The actual break-in took
place on September 2, 1971, under the direction of Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy. Id. at
943-44 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
Barker and Martinez were indicted along with Ehrlichman, Liddy, and de
Diego on March 7, 1974, under 18 U.S.C. §241 (1970) for conspiring to violate Dr.
Fielding's fourth amendment rights. They proposed a defense of absence of mens rea
due to a mistake of fact mixed with law attributable to their reasonable reliance on
Hunt's authority. Id. at 944 (Wilkey, J., concurring). This defense was rejected by the
district court. Id. On appeal the defendants refined this defense into two separate
arguments: either they did not possess the specific intent required to violate § 241, or
their mistake of fact mixed with law resulted from their reasonable reliance on Hunt's
authority, thereby negating their mens rea. Id. The first argument was rejected. Id. at
945-46 (Wilkey, J., concurring); id. at 954 (Merhige, J., concurring); id. at 970-71
(Leventhal, J., dissenting). Judges Wilkey and Merhige accepted the second, both
allowing the defendants to raise a defense based upon Barker's and Martinez'
reasonable reliance on Hunt's authority.
9. 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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plea bargains into which the defendants had entered were binding and
precluded assertion of any defense. 10 Despite the majority position, one
concurrence indicated that, absent the plea bargains, some such defense
should be allowed,' 1 while two dissents provided independent justifications
for allowing a defense similar to that proposed by the defendants. 2 In the
Ellsberg case,

United States v. Barker13 [hereinafter Barker II], the

defendants did not enter into plea bargains; nevertheless the district court
held in a memorandum opinion that no such defense could be asserted. 4 The
defendants were ultimately convicted and sentenced to three years
probation. 5 The court of appeals reversed this conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial. 16 The court was unable to agree in a signed opinion,
announcing its decision per curiam.17 Judges Wilkey and Merhige filed
concurring opinions contending that, under the facts in the instant case, the
defendants should have been allowed to present a mistake or ignorance of
law defense analogous to existing exceptions to the general rule denying an
ignorance or mistake of law defense. Judge Wilkey believed the case
analogous to situations where the defense is allowed because reliance on a
government official is virtually per se reasonable: the mistake of a
government agent relying on a magistrate's approval of an invalid search
warrant, and the mistake of a person summoned to aid a police officer who
is acting illegally.' 8 Judge Merhige, on the other hand, analogized to the
defense that Model Penal Code section 2.04(3)(b) allows a person acting in
reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law.19 Judge Leventhal
dissented strongly, arguing that permitting any defense such as that
proposed by the defendants would place the civil rights of all individuals in
jeopardy. 2°
Thus, six opinions addressed the issue whether some defense should be
allowed in the circumstances of Barker I and Barker I. Five concluded that
10. Id. at 218-27.
11. Id. at 227-37 (Bazelon, J., concurring). The defense proposed by Judge
Bazelon is discussed at notes 97 to 107 and accompanying text infra.
12. Id. at 240-48 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); id. at 263-70 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting). The defense proposed by Judge MacKinnon is discussed at notes 108 to
122 and accompanying text infra, while that proposed by Judge Wilkey is discussed at
notes 123 to 130 and accompanying text infra. Prior to their discussions of the defense
asserted by the defendants, both Judge MacKinnon and Judge Wilkey argued that the
plea bargains entered into by the defendants should be set aside. Id. at 237-40
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting); id. at 249-63 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
13. 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
14. Barker II, 546 F.2d at 944 (Wilkey, J., concurring); United States v.
Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 35 (D.D.C. 1974).
15. Barker I, 546 F.2d at 972 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 943.
17. Id. On remand to the U.S. District Court, the charges were dismissed with
prejudice at the government's request. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1976, § I, at 16, col. 4.
18. Barker II, 546 F.2d at 947-48 (Wilkey, J., concurring). Judge Wilkey relied
upon MODEL PENAL CODE §3.07(4)(a) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) to define the defense
allowed a person responding to the summons for aid of a police officer acting illegally.
19. Id. at 955 (Merhige, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 965-66 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
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it should, but the scope and justification to be given this defense differed for
each judge. Despite these differences, the analyses developed by the judges
who contend that a mistake or ignorance of law defense might be allowed
under these circumstances suggest they shared one concern: that a person
who reasonably believed his actions were legal should not be punished for
acting in what appeared to be a legal fashion. Although each judge
expressed this concern by tailoring an exception to the general rule that
mistake or ignorance of law does not excuse its violation, such a concern
suggests a modification of the general rule rather than the creation of new
exceptions to a rule to which exceptions evincing similar concerns already
exist.
This Comment will suggest that a person whose ignorance of the law or
whose mistaken belief as to what the law prohibits is reasonable should not
be subject to criminal punishment. After defining ignorance and mistake of
law it will examine the purposes generally served by criminal defenses, then
discuss the justifications advanced to support not allowing a mistake or
ignorance of law defense. It will conclude that the purposes for allowing
defenses are fulfilled, and the justifications for denying an ignorance or
mistake of law defense fail, when the ignorance or mistake of law leading to
an act ordinarily criminal is reasonable. Finally, the analyses of the circuit
judges in Barker I and Barker II will be examined to determine their
consistency with this proposition, and in the case of Judge Leventhal's
dissent, to determine whether the proposition can withstand the criticisms
he levels at the conclusions of the other judges.
II.

IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW

Any attempt to determine those circumstances under which a person
accused of a crime should be allowed to assert the defense of ignorance or
mistake of law faces the initial problem of determining what constitutes
ignorance or mistake of law. This inquiry is complicated by a lack of
analytic rigor in the case law. Courts rarely, for example, distinguish
between mistake of law and ignorance of law despite the fact that mistake
and ignorance are distinct concepts that may be approached differently. 21 In
other cases courts have blurred the distinction between ignorance or mistake
of law and ignorance or mistake of fact, a blurring of crucial importance
because mistakes of fact are ordinarily recognized as defenses to criminal
prosecutions. 22 In his dissent in Barker I, for example, Judge MacKinnon
contended that the defendants had made only a mistake of fact, that fact
being an erroneous conclusion that E. Howard Hunt had the authority to
approve their actions. 23 This blurring is not particularly surprising, for the
21. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 919. For examples of analytical approaches
distinguishing ignorance and mistake, see Keedy, supra note 2, at 90-96; Seney, supra
note 5, at 1361-1402.
22. See, e.g., PERKINS, supra note 3, at 919, 939. The mistake of fact must be such

that the conduct would have been legal had the facts been as the defendant believed
them to be. Courts differ as to whether the mistake need be reasonable. Id. at 939-40.
23. Barker 1, 514 F.2d at 241-43 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting)..
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distinction between law and fact is arbitrary in that every mistake of law
necessarily involves a mistake of fact, that fact being the person's
misperception of the state of the law at the time he committed a criminal act.
If the distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is for
some reason to be maintained, 24 classifying the mistake of the Watergate
burglars as one of fact is improper. An error concerning Hunt's authority
might have been based on one of two misconceptions. The defendants might
have believed that Hunt's official position was such that he would know the
law and that his character was such that he would not order them to act
illegally. If this was the defendants' error it was no different from any error
as to the nature of the law based upon reliance on someone who ought to
know the law. While such a defense has been recognized occasionally, it has
been recognized as an exception to the mistake of law rule rather than as a
mistake of fact. 25 If the defendants' mistake was instead a belief that Hunt
could authorize, or in effect legalize, their actions, then their mistake was
one relating to the law defining the scope of Hunt's authority.
Commentators have confused things further by their varying approaches to this definitional problem. Some have ignored it. Another,
Jerome Hall, redefined ignorance and mistake of law to exclude certain
errors ordinarily considered ignorance or mistakes of law from his
conception of the term. 26 Finally, at least one commentator has indicated
that the only mistakes of law that cannot be excused are mistakes of
criminal law. 27 Each of these approaches is flawed. Ignoring the question
what constitutes ignorance or mistake of law merely avoids it; Hall's
redefinition of mistake and ignorance of law to avoid analytic problems not
only ignores the fact that those situations defined out of mistake and
ignorance of law have traditionally been placed within that category, but
24. The most likely reason for wishing to maintain this distinction is the nature
of the law. Since law provides the rules within which the members of a state or society
are to operate, the state or society arguably has a stronger interest in discouraging
ignorance or mistakes about these rules than it has in discouraging ignorance or
mistakes about other facts that may lead to violation of these rules.
25. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw - THE GENERAL PART 293-304 (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS]; Hall & Seligman, supra 2, at 654-83; Kohler, supra
note 2, at 122. Two cases allowing a mistake of law defense where the defendant had
relied upon a person in a position to know the law are State v. Davis, 63 Wis. 2d 75,
216 N.W.2d 31 (1974), discussed at notes 3 and 6 supra, and Long v. State, 44 Del. 262,
65 A.2d 489 (1949), where the defendant had remarried after consulting with and
relying on counsel with respect to the legality of a prior divorce.
For an argument that many exceptions to the denial of a defense based on
mistake of law are outside of the ignorantiajuris doctrine, see J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 389-402 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
Hall's discussion of ignorantiajuris was previously published as Hall, Ignorance and
Mistake in CriminalLaw, 33 IND. L.J. 1 (1957). Hall's analysis is treated in notes 71 to
90 and accompanying text infra.
26. HALL, supra note 25, at 389-402. Hall's analysis is treated in notes 71 to 90
and accompanying text, infra.
27. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 344-45. See generally BarkerI, 514 F.2d at 233-34
n.34.
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Stating that only mistakes or
also poses certain new analytic problems.
ignorance of criminal law are not excused also seems unjustified. Mistakes
of non-criminal law leading to criminal liability are infrequent. This
infrequency does not appear to be because courts recognize an exception to
the general rule that ignorance or mistake of law is not excusing, but
because in the vast majority of instances where ignorance or mistake of noncriminal law leads to a criminal act some reason for not applying the
doctrine that ignorance or mistake of law is not excusing already exists for
reasons unrelated to the criminal or non-criminal nature of the law
respecting which the error was made. A person who takes another's property
not having made a mistake as to the property's identity, and believing that
the property belongs to him rather than the other, for example, has made a
mistake of property law, for he must believe that the law defining ownership
of that property vests some legal interest in him. The putative thief is
excused from criminal liability not because his mistake was one of noncriminal law, but because he does not have the mens rea necessary for
larceny.2 9 Larceny requires a specific intent to deprive another of his
property permanently, and this intent cannot be formed when the putative
thief believes the property belongs to him.
This Comment does not pretend to develop some radically new
definition of ignorance or mistake of law, but rather than accept any of the
redefinitions of mistake or ignorance of law postulated above, this Comment
will utilize a broad definition of the phrase. For its purposes, ignorance or
mistake of law exists when: (1) some fact that is either not perceived by the
actor or is misperceived by him is based upon a legal determination, and (2)
the actor is either ignorant of or mistaken as to the requirements of this law.
For our purposes a third requirement exists: (3) the act undertaken is
criminal. The Barker cases exemplify this: (1) Hunt's authority was based
upon law defining the scope of his authority; (2) the burglars either did not
know this law or were wrong about its nature; and (3) their actions in
reliance on this nonexistent authority were illegal.O

III.

FUNCTION OF A DEFENSE

31

The justifications for allowing a defense to an offense otherwise punishable must be examined before resolving the question whether a defense
should be allowed under some circumstances for ignorance or mistake of
law. These justifications are closely related to the purposes for establishing
a criminal punishment system. In each case three interrelated considerations arise. First, if any purpose is ordinarily fulfilled by invoking criminal
28. See notes 71 to 90 and accompanying text, infra.
29. See PERKINS, supra note 3, at 265-66.
30. Other discussions of the nature of the distinction between fact and law may
be found in WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 287; Kohler, supra note 2, at 113.
31. For an excellent discussion of the problems treated in this section, see H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

(1968) [hereinafter cited as

Chapters 3 to 6 (pp. 35-135) are particularly pertinent.

PACKER].
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sanctions it must be determined whether that purpose is still fulfilled when
allegedly excusing conditions arise. 32 Second, if this purpose continues to be
fulfilled when the allegedly excusing conditions exist, some societal interest
other than those served by criminal law may still militate against imposing
criminal sanctions. Finally, even if the purposes of criminal punishment are
not fulfilled or other societal interests militate against punishing a person
when certain excusing conditions exist, criminal punishment might still be
imposed where the practical problems involved in distinguishing those who
ought to be punished from those who should be exculpated are so severe that
the attempt to distinguish them undermines the criminal justice system.
A.

Justificationsfor Criminal Punishment

Justifications for the imposition of criminal liability tend to fall into one
of three classes.33 The oldest of these is the retributive theory of punishment:
a culpable or blameworthy individual must be punished before either society
or God. 34 Retribution is usually justified on one of two bases: either the
criminal must expiate his "sin" through punishment, or he must suffer in
order to satiate society's sense of outrage that might otherwise take more
reprehensible forms.

35

With the advent of utilitarianism developed the theory that deterrence of
crime is the primary justification for criminal punishment. 36 The deterrent
effect of imposing criminal sanctions can take one of two forms: it can deter
32. This would not apply where a defense, such as the exclusionary rule or alibi,
bears no relationship to excusing conditions.
33. Several discussions of the comparative values of the various justifications for
imposing criminal punishment are found in 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 36-38 (M.
Howe ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as HOLMES]; Andenaes, The General Preventive
Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966); Gardiner, The Purposes of
Criminal Punishment, 21 MOD.L. REV. 117 (1958); Hadden, A Plea for Punishment,
1965 CAMB. L. J. 117.
A fourth justification, restraining the criminal so that he cannot repeat his
offense, is sometimes classified as a form of deterrence. By itself this justification is
inadequate to explain our system of criminal punishment, for it would preclude such
things as probation and suspended sentences. In any case, a restraint justification for
criminal punishment would not preclude a mistake or ignorance of law defense. A
person who acted in ignorance of or with a mistaken belief as to the law was not
aware that his behavior was sanctioned. Once made aware of the relevant law such a
person is unlikely to repeat his offense, removing the need for restraint.
34. The concept of retributioh is found in the Lex Talionis of the Old Testament:
"And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for
stripe." Exodus 21: 23-25 (King James ed.). Other statements of this law are found in
Leviticus 24: 19-20 and Deuteronomy 19: 19-21.
35. See PACKER, supra note 31, at 37-39.
36. Interestingly, some sense of the deterrent value of punishment may have
underlain the Lex Talionis. The version of this law found in Deuteronomy, a version
bearing on the problem of the false witness, stated that the perjurer should have done
to him that which he had thought to have done to the person against whom he bore
false witness. Deuterpnomy 19: 16-19. "And those which remain shall hear, and fear,
and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil among you. And thine eye shall
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the convicted individual from repeating his sanctioned behavior by
incarcerating or intimidating him, or it can deter others from acting in a
similarly unacceptable fashion. Although deterrence had originally been
thought to encourage individuals to consciously balance the harms and
benefits of acting criminally, the development of more sophisticated models
of human behavior led to the recognition that punishment might deter
criminal behavior more successfully by inhibiting, through threats and
socialization, improper behavior and immorality to the point where
individuals would not even consciously consider acting in the prohibited
37
manner.
Rehabilitation of the criminal, the third purpose advanced for imposing
criminal punishment, 38 by itself seems an inadequate justification for a
system of criminal punishment separate from programs designed to benefit
non-criminals. Rehabilitation is directed toward improving the individual
rather than protecting the interests of society. Were this the primary purpose
of criminal law no reason would exist for distinguishing criminal from civil
commitment proceedings, for in each case the aim of the proceeding would
be to isolate a person presently incapable of living with others in an attempt
to reintegrate him into society. Whether or not such a distinction is proper,
the distinction is made. Thus, to the extent that criminal as opposed to
purely civil law is justified it must draw its justification from some other
39
theory.
Accepting retribution and deterrence as justifications for having a
criminal law system still leaves the problem of determining under what
circumstances retribution should be exacted and in what situations
punishment actually deters. One condition under which a person should be
excused from criminal liability if the retributive theory is accepted is
obvious: a person should not be held liable for his actions if he is not
blameworthy. Since culpability is normally associated with the combination
of an action and a mental state, blame does not attach when this requisite
mental state is absent.
Requiring blameworthiness when deterrence is advanced as the
justification for punishment is a less obvious need, for the primary
limitation upon criminal sanctions under such a system would be the failure
of the sanction to deter or the absence of a desire to deter certain forms of
behavior. As with retribution, however, non-criminal law appears to serve
this deterrent function as well as criminal law unless conviction of a crime is
considered qualitatively different from a determination of civil liability, for
making whole the victim at the expense of the tortfeasor certainly
discourages the tortfeasor from repeating his actions. The nature and degree
not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot." Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added in first sentence; in original translation in second
sentence).
37. See PACKER, supra note 31, at 39-53.
38. See, e.g., B. WoorrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 101 (1963).
39. See

PACKER,

Punishment, 1965

supra note 31, at 53-58. See generally Hadden, A Plea for

CAMB. L. J. 117.

1977]

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

of injury a person sustains as a result of civil versus criminal liability does
not sufficiently distinguish the two, for a severe civil judgment can be far
more damaging than a light criminal penalty. The primary distinction
between criminal and civil sanctions under a deterrent theory appears to be
an additional factor going beyond the infliction of sanctions or the degree of
those sanctions: the determination that the sanctioned person is guilty, with
the societal condemnation that this determination entails. 40 If the criminal
system punishes people who are not considered guilty it not only destroys
the justification for its independent existence, but also jeopardizes one of its
major functions. If people feel that innocent, non-blameworthy individuals
are being punished by. the criminal law, the stigma attached to a finding of
criminal liability will be weakened or destroyed, thereby wiping out one, if
not the major, deterrent of criminal law.
41
With the exceptioli of certain modem "absolute liability" offenses,
blameworthiness or criminality has been found to exist when an individual
40. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401,

404-405 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hart, Aims of the Criminal Law]. Cf. PACKER,
supra note 31, at 62-70 (arguing that the concept of culpability or blameworthiness
places limits upon the scope of behavior that should be punished in order to deter
others).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943):
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now
familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of
regulation. Such regulation dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct - awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.
Thus an offense of this kind, sometimes known as a public welfare offense, requires
no blameworthiness on the part of the defendant. The Court has indicated in the
above excerpt a second distinguishing feature of these offenses: their purpose differs
from the purpose of other crimes in that they regulate some danger for the public's
benefit rather than fulfill one of the more traditional goals of criminal punishment.
This difference in purpose has resulted in attempts to distinguish public welfare
offenses from other crimes. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(1933). Legislation creating such offenses has been criticized as imposing criminal
sanctions where criminal punishment is improper. See Hart, Aims of the Criminal
Law, supra note 40, at 121-31. Perhaps because of the different justifications for
public welfare offenses and other crimes, the Supreme Court has avoided finding that
statutory crimes resembling traditional crimes were absolute liability offenses even
where they appeared not to require any awareness of wrongdoing by their terms. In
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260-63 (1952), for example, the Court found
that a statutory theft offense included a mental element despite the fact that the
statutory definition of the crime included no such element because of the close

relationship of the statutory offense to certain common law crimes.
Even when offenses lacking a mental element have been found to exist the
Court has indicated that notice as to potential illegality may be required for the
statute to be validly applied. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1959). Cf. United
States v. International Min'ls Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563-64 (1971); United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (in both cases the Court indicated that the convicted
individual should not have been surprised to learn that his behavior was regulated
and that he had committed an illegal act). This knowledge, if it actually should have
existed, arguably justifies calling the defendant's behavior blameworthy.
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acts in a proscribed fashion (actus reus) with a particular state of mind
(mens rea).42 This state of mind has normally been defined as an intent to
perform the elements of the crime rather than an intent to act illegally. Thus
ignorance or a mistaken belief that an act was legal would not preclude
liability unless the knowledge of illegality itself was included as one of the
elements of the offense. Most crimes, however, are not defined in this
fashion. The fact that crimes so defined are the exception, combined with
the antiquity of the denial of an excuse for criminal acts where ignorance or
mistake of law is asserted as the reason for the illegal act, suggests that lack
of knowledge of the law may be irrelevant to blameworthiness.
Three responses to this suggestion can be made. Most obviously, what is
relevant or irrelevant to blameworthiness may change over time. Acts once
prohibited are now considered legal, 43 and no reason exists for believing that
similar changes cannot take place with regard to general concepts of
blameworthiness. Such changes are attitudinal rather than analytical, and
the possibility of such change should be recognized.
The absence of a defense for ignorance or mistake of law, moreover, may
be an historic aberration. The concept of mens rea (or a culpable mental
state) and the refusal to provide any excuse for a criminal act caused by
44
mistake or ignorance of law seem to have evolved at about the same time.
Significantly, the justification given for not allowing a mistake of law
defense seems to have been that a man was presumed to know the law and,
in fact, had an obligation to know the law. 45 The absurdity of this

42. This discussion gives a simplified formulation of the concepts of mens rea and
blameworthiness, for mens rea may be characterized as merely the mental state

necessary for a crime. Mens rea and blameworthiness or culpability might be viewed
as two separate characteristics, with mens rea being merely one of those factors
whose absence might negate blameworthiness or culpability. See generally PACKER,
supra note 31, at 104-06; Hall & Seligman, supra note 2, at 641-43; Sayre, Mens Rea,
45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Sayre]. Sayre details the
development of mens rea from an emphasis on general blameworthiness to more
specific mental elements for specific crimes. Id. at 994-1004. He indicates, however,
that various defenses developed from this general conception of blameworthiness in
that "[t]he conception of moral blameworthiness or moral guilt is necessarily based
upon a free mind voluntarily choosing evil rather than good; there can be no
criminality in the sense of moral shortcoming if there is no freedom of choice or
normality of will capable of exercising a free choice." Id. at 1004. This view raises
questions concerning the relationship of morals and law beyond the scope of this
Comment. Compare Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
43. Perhaps the most obvious change of this sort in recent times is the repeal of
prohibition. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII & XXI. On the other hand, behavior once
legal is now considered reprehensible. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibition of
slavery).
44. See Sayre, supra note 42; texts cited at note 2 supra.
45. E.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 27 (1772): "For a mistake in point of
law, which every person of discretion not only may but is bound and presumed to
know, is in criminal cases no sort of defense. Ignorantiajuris, quod quisque tenetur
scire, neminem excusat, is as well the maxim of our own law, as it was of the Roman."
See Hall & Seligman, supra note 2, at 645-46.
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justification was pointed out at an early date by Judge Maule: "Everybody is
presumed to know the law except His Majesty's Judges, who have a Court of
Appeal set over them to put them right." 46 Such a justification seems even
more tenuous in a modern world where complex regulation permeates every
level of government. At an earlier time when the law was less complex and
an individual's legal obligations were more congruent with his moral and
religious duties, however, the presumption that a man knew the law was
more realistic. Thus, at the time the doctrine of mens rea was evolving it was
probably thought unnecessary to require knowledge of legality, for if a
person knowingly acted in the proscribed manner he either knew or should
47
have known that his acts were illegal.
If this congruence between intent to fulfill the elements of an offense
and knowledge of illegality actually existed, then it was reasonable to
exclude from mens rea a requirement that an individual know, or should
know, of the illegality of an act, and to enforce a rule preventing assertion of
ignorance or mistake of law as a defense. When law becomes so complex
that the congruence no longer exists, however, a recognition that mistake or
ignorance of the law precludes blameworthiness is more reasonable. Finally,
excepting absolute liability offenses, some mental state such as knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence is required to fulfill the elements of an offense in
order for the conduct to be punished as a crime. No reason seems to exist for
distinguishing between the blameworthiness of fulfilling the elements of an
offense and not knowing of or being mistaken as to the nature of the offense.
In the absence of some justification for continuing the rule other than an
historical one, the denial of a defense, at least under circumstances where a
reasonable person could believe his actions legal, seems an anachronism
continued through blind application of the principle of stare decisis.48
46. See WiuiA Ms, supra note 25, at 290. Williams also refers to Lord Mansfield's
comment on this question: "[Ilt would be very hard upon the profession, if the law was
so certain, that everybody knew it." Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 37, 40, 98 Eng. Rep.
954, 956 (1774).
47. The presumption that everyone knows the law may explain the distinction
historically drawn between mistakes of law and fact. If a person were ignorant of or
mistaken about some fact that made his action illegal, then it would be impossible for
that person to have intended to fulfill the elements of an offense unless the fact he
misperceived would have also led to illegal action. At the time mens rea was evolving
legal duties may have been thought so clear and so tied to existing moral standards
that it would be impossible to be mistaken as to their nature, or that any such mistake
implied moral blameworthiness. If so, there would be no point in permitting an
individual to raise the defense. Where the law had become so complex that a person
might be unclear as to his rights and obligations, a court might be persuaded to
modify or create an exception to the general rule. Since such exceptions would only
arise in actual cases, however, the traditionally conservative judiciary would tend to
redefine the offense so as to require a knowledge of the complex law as a preprequisite
to conviction. An example of this situation might be found in the development of the
crime of larceny. If property law were complex, a person who took property believing
it his would not be liable for larceny because of his ignorance that the law actually
vested the property's possession in another.
48. Whether the people who were the actual Watergate and Ellsberg burglars were
acting in a context where a reasonable person might conclude his actions legal is not
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B. Freedom of Choice
Under most conditions the failure to hold someone criminally liable can
be explained by showing that that person was not blameworthy. In some
cases, however, persons are not held criminally liable even where it seems
that public morality has clearly been outraged by behavior that would
popularly be considered blameworthy4 9 Unless the failure to punish these
persons is considered an aberration of the criminal justice system, the
definition of crimes and existence of defenses for blameworthy persons must
be the product of policies or purposes outside the general societal interest in
punishing blameworthy individuals. Many such policies exist, ° and one
that appears to underlie our theory of government is the maximization of
individual freedom. 51 This freedom consists of the ability of the individual to
choose the way he will conduct his life. Although the existence of society
requires that constraints be placed on the options open to the individual,
this emphasis on choice indicates that a person should not be punished
blindly for violating society's dictates. His capacity or opportunity to comply
with these dictates should be evaluated both subjectively and objectively. 2
If a person is not to be punished unless he has chosen to act in a
proscribed manner, he must at a minimum have the capacity to choose to
act in a permitted or approved fashion. If he is mentally or physically
incapable of complying with the law, then no punishment should be
a question to be resolved in this Comment. The background of the burglars, their prior
involvement in undercover activities, and their past experience with Hunt being such
as to lead them to trust him implicitly, combined with his apparent high office and
contacts with those in the White House, appear to be factors which, at a minimum,
raise the question of how reasonable men would view the legality of their actions
under similar circumstances. Regardless of whether or not the burglars are considered
blameworthy, other factors might militate against conviction in their cases.
49. See, e.g., Bazely's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799). See generally PACKER, supra
note 31, at 80-85. It is represented by the maxim "nullum crimen sine lege" (no crime
without law). The argument that freedom of choice is a policy consideration
independent of blameworthiness is an uncertain proposition, for freedom of choice can
be viewed as a prerequisite to being morally blameworthy. See note 42 supra. Rather
than delve deeply into this question, this Comment postulates a somewhat artificial
distinction between these questions of blameworthiness and freedom of choice. It
assumes that blameworthiness reflects the moral judgment of the community, and
that in a particular case this may not be congruent with the question of whether a
person had the ability to choose or not to choose to act in a certain fashion. Instead it
holds up this freedom of choice as an independent factor in our form of government,
limiting punishment regardless of the outrage that certain types of behavior might
engender. An example of this is the prohibition against ex post facto laws. No matter
how blameworthy a person might seem, no matter how morally repugnant his choice
to act in a certain fashion, he will not be criminally punished if his behavior was
prohibited only after he acted, for he was incapable of determining how blameworthy
his actions were in the eyes of society until society prohibited that form of conduct.
50. The fourth amendment and exclusionary rules derived therefrom, as well as
the defense of entrapment, for example, seem to reflect a policy that it is unfair for the
government to use oppressive methods against an individual.
51. See, e.g., U. S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIII-XV, XIX.
52. See generally Hart, Aims of the Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 412-13.
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inflicted. Thus the insane individual who is incapable of comprehending the
impropriety of his conduct or the person who acts out of necessity or under
duress is normally excused from criminal liability. The excuse allowed a
person who performs a criminal act because of ignorance or mistaken belief
as to some fact seems to fit within this category as well, for unless an
individual perceived the fact that makes his action illegal he has not made a
choice to act in an illegal fashion.
The fact that certain behavior is blameworthy in the eyes of society does
not provide an adequate guide for people attempting to make a choice
between acting in conformity with, or in opposition to, the mores of society,
for different times and different individuals in the same time consider
different acts and mental states blameworthy. Certain forms of behavior
might be so blatantly improper that a person who considers acting in such a
fashion should be aware that his conduct is blameworthy. But because such
behavior shades into other, less improper actions, which shade into proper
conduct, predicting when such situations will occur appears to be an
impossible task. 53 Thus, rather than risk punishing those who might have
chosen to conform with societal standards had those standards been defined
adequately, the state in our society chooses not to hold criminally
responsible individuals whose behavior and mental state are not proscribed
they might
by the criminal law with some degree of clarity, even though
54
have deliberately chosen to act in a blameworthy fashion.
A necessary corollary to this requirement that prohibited behavior be
defined is the principle that a person must be able to discover from the law
whether his behavior is prohibited. Thus, ex post facto laws are prohibited
because it is fundamentally unfair to prosecute a person who could not
foresee that his actions would be declared criminal in the future. Similarly,
courts have refused to impose criminal liability where it was impossible or
nearly impossible for the defendant to determine the content of the law or
ordinance supporting prosecution.5 5 Because the meaning of words is
inexact, it is impossible to define any crime in a fashion that definitively
states whether a particular form of behavior comes within its terms.
Consequently, courts have tended to construe criminal statutes narrowly in
order to exclude from criminal liability those who may not have been put on
sufficient notice of the criminality of their actions. 56 In fact, where the
statute was so unclear that a person could not determine whether he was
53. This is not to say that a person could not be on notice as to the possibility, or
even the probability, that certain conduct is culpable in the absence of a statute. If
society's aim is to maximize individual choice, however, some objective standard must
exist against which a person can measure the probability that he will be found
culpable by society. Otherwise that person may be dissuaded from acting by the fear
that behavior he considers innocent will be condemned by others.
54. See generally J. AUSTIN, II LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 169-71 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as

AUSTIN]; HOLMES,

supra note 33, at 41.

55. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); PERKINS, supra note 3, at
928-29; Hall & Seligman, supra note 2, at 654-75; Kohler, supra note 2, at 116-17.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); United States v.

Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820).
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criminally liable, common law courts tended to find a mistake of law
excusing. 57 The constitutional due process doctrine that a vague statute be
held void continues this traditional judicial intercession between the
individual and unclear societal dictates. 58
Persons generally are not punished unless they have chosen to act in a
prohibited fashion. 59 If it is this choice to act illegally that forms the basis
for criminal punishment, then no reason exists for not treating ignorance or
mistake of law as a factor making it impossible to choose between acting in
accordance with society's determination of what is permitted and what is
prohibited behavior 0 Allowing a defense in all circumstances where a
person is ignorant of or mistaken as to the meaning of the law on the ground
that such a person does not have the capacity to choose to act in accordance
with the law, however, still leaves a definitional problem, for lack of
capacity can mean one of two things. It can be viewed in purely subjective
terms: did the alleged criminal, given his total mental state, have the ability
to make a choice to act legally? Accepting this definition may create
analytic problems for, as Jerome Hall points out, the ultimate meaning of
the law is inherently unknowable in that it is declared only when an
alithorized law-declaring official speaks on a particular case. 61 Alternatively
a more objective approach can be taken. If a reasonable person given the
information this individual had would not have concluded that his acts had
the potential of being illegal, then that individual arguably did not have the
capacity to choose to act in a lawful fashion, for the information available to
him when viewed as a whole did not put him on notice of the potential of
illegality. In effect this would impose a negligence standard on a person
asserting a mistake or ignorance of law defense, for punishment would be
justified when a reasonable person should have been put on notice that his
57. See Kohler, supra note 2, at 118. Contra, Hall & Seligman, supra note 2, at
666.
58. See generally Hall & Seligman, supra note 2, at 666-67. Although indicating
that the void-for-vagueness doctrine serves a broader range of policies than simply
nullifying vague statutes, one student commentator indicates that this function is
served as well. Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67, 85-87 (1960).
59. Debate exists over whether criminal punishment should also be imposed on
an individual who had the capacity to choose to act legally but failed to exercise that
capacity and acted in a proscribed fashion. See generally Wasserstrom, H. L. A. Hart
and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 92
(1967); Note, Negligence and the General Problemof CriminalResponsibility, 81 YALE
L. J. 949 (1972).
60. The fact that individuals should not be punished under this analysis does not
necessarily mean that they will escape punishment if some "policy reason" requires
that they not be distinguished from culpable individuals. See notes 31 & 32 and
accompanying text supra. Nor does it mean that they should necessarily escape all
liability for their actions. Violation of a law implies some sort of harm to another or to
society in general, and liability for this injury might be required in some instances to
compensate for this harm. It is questionable, however, whether this liability should be
criminal.
61. HALL, supra note 25, at 388. For a discussion of Hall's analysis, see notes 71
to 90 and accompanying text infra.
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actions might be criminal and, although he could have 62
done so, did not act
to ascertain whether his actions were in fact criminal.
Assuming that a person has been put on notice that a course of conduct
may be criminal, his investigation may yield one of three results: it may
allay the fear that the conduct is criminal; it may leave open the possibility
of criminality; or it may confirm that the action is illegal. If it confirms
illegality no ignorance or mistake of law defense remains available. If the
person is still aware that there is a possibility his behavior may be criminal,
then he is still on notice that his behavior may be criminal, and is under a
continuing obligation to determine the legality of his conduct and may not
raise ignorance or mistake of law as a defense. 63 Finally, investigation may
lead a person to the conclusion that his proposed action is legal, a
conclusion that may or may not be reasonable. If a person reasonably, but
wrongly, concludes after investigation that his action is not prohibited, then
he is in the same position as the person who had no reason to believe his
action was criminal and is consequently no longer on notice that his acts
might be illegal. Without this notice the legality of conduct may be assumed,
and thus the necessity of choosing between acting legally or illegally has
been eliminated. On the other hand, if he unreasonably concludes that his
action is not prohibited, he nevertheless still has information placing him on
notice that his action might be illegal, but has not acted on that
information. A reasonable person would have known the possibility of
illegality still existed. Implicitly the capacity to choose to act legally also
continued to exist, and criminal liability might be justified.
Maximizing individual freedom is a general principle underlying our
theory of government; from the individual's point of view this freedom
consists of an ability to make his own choices. Yet, society's need to regulate
or prohibit certain forms of behavior necessarily limits this freedom. Since
freedom to choose is a fundamental principle of this society, it should be
reluctant to impose punishment on a person who acts either without
knowing that his behavior is prohibited or who, after an investigation to
determine whether what he wants to do is legal, acts in the reasonable belief
that it is permitted. Either punishment should be inflicted only after it has
been determined that a knowing, deliberate choice to violate the law was
made, or it also can be legitimately inflicted in situations where a person
has the capacity to choose to act legally, but in effect negligently fails to
make this choice.
Ignorance or mistake of law is a factor that can lead either to an
absence of knowledge of an act's illegality, or to reasonable ignorance or
mistake as to its legality. In either situation the capacity to choose has been
negated. If no other considerations require that a person who is at least
reasonably ignorant or mistaken about the law be punished, a defense of
some sort should be allowed.
62. Even if the law is ultimately unknowable, it is still possible to determine the
likelihood of criminality to a high probability. A person would still be obligated to
inquire into the legality of his actions.
63. Awareness is used in the sense that an ordinary person would not have had
his fears allayed.
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C. Effect on the Criminal Justice System
One additional consideration does exist. Commentators have argued
that allowing a mistake or ignorance of law defense would impair the
operation of a system of criminal law. An early justification for the rule
disallowing the defense was offered by John Selden: "Ignorance of the law
excuses no man; not that all men know the law, but because it is an excuse
every man will plead, and no man can tell how to confute him. ' 64 Austin
65
elaborated this argument in his Lectures on Jurisprudence,
claiming that
for a court to determine whether a person was truly ignorant or mistaken as
to the law would require two factual determinations: was the party ignorant
of the law at the time of the alleged wrong, and, if so, was the ignorance
inevitable; or were the party's circumstances such that he might have
known the law had he tried? After posing these questions Austin deemed
them nearly insoluble:
Whether the party was really ignorant of the law, and was so ignorant
of the law that he had no surmise of its provisions, could scarcely be
,determined by any evidence accessible to others. And for the purpose of
determining the cause of his ignorance (its reality being ascertained), it
were incumbent upon the tribunal to unravel its previous history, and to
66
search his whole life for the elements of a just solution.
A pragmatic reply to this argument is that triers of fact continually
make equally hard decisions.6 7 Virtually all crimes, for example, include a
mens rea element requiring that the state of mind of an accused be probed to
some extent. Since the state of mind of a person may be characterized as the
product of his past, investigation of personal history is justified nearly every
time an accused is tried. Austin argues that any inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding a mistake of law would be interminable. 68 He
failed to recognize that equally interminable questions are successfully
treated by triers of fact. Another example of this failure is Austin's
distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. He states that
"[t]he inquiry [into a mistake of fact] is limited to a given incident, and to
the circumstances attending that incident, and is, therefore, not interminable." 69 One of the circumstances attending a mistake of fact, however, is the
ignorant or mistaken person's state of mind. It would seem that the same
64. J. SELDEN, TABLE TALK-LAw 61 (3d ed. 1716).
65. AUSTIN, supra note 54, at 171-77.
66. Id. at 172.
67. Holmes pointed out that parties to a case were once unable to testify. With
parties able to testify he doubted whether a person's knowledge of law would be any
harder to investigate than many questions treated by courts. He felt that any
difficulty with problems of proof that might continue to exist could be met by
throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the defendant. HOLMES, supra note 33,
at 41. The problem could be met by throwing only the burden of production on the
defendant, for the trier of fact has the option of disbelieving the defendant's evidence.
68. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
69. AUSTIN, supra note 54, at 172 (note at bottom of page).
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measures used by courts to limit inquiry into the state of mind of a person
raising a mistake of fact defense could be applied when ignorance or
mistake of law is claimed as a defense. Finally, certain crimes require that
mistake of law questions be passed upon.70 For example, inquiry into the
accused's ignorance or knowledge of property law is necessary when he
asserts he believed the property he took to be his and he has not made a
mistake as to the identity of the property. This inquiry has not proved to be
interminable.
Austin argued that it is impossible to determine absolutely whether a
person was ignorant or mistaken as to the law or whether he was negligent
in his ignorance of the law. This is correct, but it is equally true that nothing
can be proven to the point of certainty, and all questions are therefore
necessarily interminable. The need to accept an approximation of certainty
is illustrated by the standard of proof required to sustain a criminal
conviction: a jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than
to an absolute certainty, of criminal guilt. A tribunal rarely has all the facts
necessary for a perfectly just determination of a case, for some facts are
never presented and others are excluded. This does not prevent courts from
reaching conclusions. Austin's objections are essentially evidentiary.
Instead of treating evidence of mistake or ignorance of law in the same
manner as evidence of other matters equally difficult of proof, however, he
argues that the defense should not be allowed. Instead of leading to his ideal
"just solution," denying the defense precludes the possibility of a more just
solution based upon all available evidence.
Jerome Hall's objection to allowing a defense based upon either mistake
or ignorance of law7 1 is more fundamental than mere problems of proof. Hall
initially posits that law is based upon what he refers to as three "principles
of legality":
(1) That rules of law express objective meanings;
(2) That certain [authorized officials] ... shall. . . declare what those
meanings are . . .; and
(3) That these, and only these interpretations are binding, i.e. only
these meanings of the rules are the law. 72
He claims that permitting an ignorance or mistake of law defense would
undermine these principles; in his opinion allowing the defense in effect
substitutes the defendant's interpretation of the law for that of the judge. In
turn, this substitution destroys objectivity, substitutes private for official
interpretation, and renders the official interpretation meaningless in that it
no longer binds individuals.
Hall's argument confuses allowing an excuse where the law has been
violated with condoning the violation. Permitting a defense of mistake or
ignorance does not result in subjective rules of law, for the official
70. See note 3 supra.
71. HALL, supra note 25, at 376-414.
72. Id. at 383.
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interpretation of the law is not denounced or no longer applied. An exception
to its application has merely been created. Nor does it elevate unauthorized
declarations of the law to the level of being the law: one person's mistake
cannot be asserted as an excuse for another's violation. Nor does it dilute the
binding effect of interpretations by authorized officials, for in fact the
conditions under which this exception could be applied would necessarily be
determined by these same authorized officials. Rather, it excuses the
violation in spite of its lack of congruence with the ordinarily binding,
objective interpretation of the law. In like manner the violation of the
community's values is excused without being condoned.
Since the moral values of the community are expressed in the law, Hall
also felt ignorance of the law could not be countenanced in that it
undermined maintenance of the community's objective morality.7 3 Thus,
Hall's theory poses a second, related objection to allowing an ignorance or
mistake of law defense: that this defense would allow an excuse for behavior
condemned by the moral standards of the community as expressed in the
community's laws. Whether emphasis is placed on the substitution of the
defendant's belief as to the law for the actual law or this moral basis of the
law, no reason exists under Hall's theory for not allowing an ignorance or
mistake of law defense whenever the mistake or ignorance was such that a
reasonable member of the community would not have felt his actions
morally reprehensible, or at least would not have been on notice that the
community would find his actions reprehensible. Judging the defendant by
this objective standard would by definition neither substitute the defendant's view of the law or the defendant's morality for that of the community,
for the defendant's beliefs would be judged against those of a hypothetical
person by the community's standards. Even an acquittal under this
standard would not condone the defendant's behavior. It would merely
excuse the behavior because no reasonable member of the community could
have been expected to conform with the community's standard of behavior
under the same circumstances.
Hall attempts to demonstrate the propriety of denying the mistake or
ignorance of law defense by arguing that the few recognized exceptions to
the general rule denying the defense are not truly exceptions but are rather
independent excuses. Specifically, Hall extracts two classes of cases
ordinarily classified as mistake or ignorance of law exceptions and treats
them as independent excuses not constituting ignorance or mistakes of
law. 74 The first class consists of cases involving "mistakes" that result from
reliance on authorized authority.75 Where a statute is declared unconstitutional after having been previously found constitutional, or a lower court's
holding upon which a person relied is overruled by a higher court, or some
authorized interpretive authority is overturned, Hall argues that no
ignorance or mistake problem exists because the law relied on was actually
73. Id.
74. HALL, supra note 25, at 389-92.
75. Id.

1977]

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

the law of that time.7 6 This, however, conflicts with Hall's first principle of
legality, that "rules of law express objective meanings." Hall's argument
77
postulates that the same rule of law can vary in meaning both over time
78
and among interpretive authorities. That such conflicts exist seems
7 9
incompatible with the attempt to assign an objective meaning to the law.
In any case, only the ultimate authority for interpreting the law can assign
such an "objective meaning" to the law.80 Thus reliance on mistaken
authorities other than the ultimate tribunal would still seem to constitute a
mistake of law.
The second class of cases that Hall defines out of the mistake of law
area are those crimes in which a mistake of non-criminal law negatives
mens rea.8 1 He seems to argue that the moral value represented by creating
such crimes is not violated by a person who was ignorant or mistaken as to
the relevant non-criminal law.8 2 But, as Hall himself points out, a violation
of non-criminal law, as well as a violation of criminal law, can indicate
moral blameworthiness.8 3 Saying that blameworthiness is negated by this
mistake or ignorance gives no means for determining what non-criminal law
does not denote blameworthiness and what non-criminal (and criminal) law
does.8 4 Hall illustrates his argument by claiming that ignorance or mistake
76. Id.
77. Compare Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (sustaining
the constitutionality of a compulsory flag salute in public schools despite religious
objections by Jehovah's Witnesses) with West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (expressly overruling the Gobitis decision only three years later).
The Supreme Court has reversed itself in this fashion on many occasions. See
generally Blaustein & Field, "Overruling"Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 151 (1958).
78. Compare Fisher v. United States, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S.
391 (1976) (holding that tax documents held by an accountant, then transferred to the
criminal defendant, then transferred to the defendant's attorney were not privileged
and could be subpoenaed) with Kasmir v. United States, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that substantially identical documents were
privileged and quashing a subpoena for their production).
79. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
80. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Were it not true that only the ultimate authority could assign "objective"
meaning to the law reversal on appeal could not take place, for the objective meaning
of the law would have previously been determined.
81. HALL, supra note 25, at 389-92.
82. See id. at 393. Hall later speaks of certain types of crimes where knowledge of
illegality is necessary for a defendant to be culpable, id. at 395-401, but provides no
real test for distinguishing such offenses from others where knowledge of illegality is
not necessary for a person to be culpable.
83. See id. at 394.
84. This argument of Hall's appears to parallel that in WILLIAMS, supra note 25,
at 304-45. Williams suggested that a "claim of right" (i.e. a belief by the defendant
that he had a right to act as he did) would negate culpability. As has been stated
above, Hall gives no indication of when he would allow his defense. A more rational
approach than categorizing those crimes where a defense should be allowed would be
to examine the evidence presented to prove ignorance or mistake of law in all cases to
determine the reasonableness of any alleged error.
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of property law that leads a person to believe that something is his does not
conflict with the ethical principle that a person should not take another's
property.85 However, a person who takes the property of another through
ignorance or mistake of law has acted against society's determination of
what belongs to him as reflected in the law. Acting in a way contrary to this
determination seems to have the same potential for being culpable as
6
shooting a person in the mistaken belief that a right existed to shoot him.
Culpability is a legitimate prerequisite for inflicting criminal punishment,
but if no clear line can be drawn between culpable and non-culpable civil
law violations the negation of mens rea by ignorance or mistake of law
should be considered an exception to the rule of ignorantiajuris rather than
outside it.
In addition to attempting to place these two types of exceptions outside
the rule denying a defense, Hall carves a limited exception from the
ignorantiajuris doctrine: "As regards certain petty offenses, where normal
conscience (moral attitudes) and understanding cannot be relied upon to
avoid the forbidden conduct, knowledge of the law is essential to culpability;
hence the doctrine of ignorantiajuris should not be applied there. 87 This
exception also suffers from the weakness inherent in distinguishing lawbreaking conduct which demonstrates culpability from that which does not.
In effect, Hall is creating an exception to the general rule regarding
ignorance and mistake of law for a class of crimes where a reasonable
person would not ordinarily be placed on notice of the potential criminality
of his actions. If this lack of notice negatives culpability, however, no reason
seems to exist for the additional requirement that the defense be limited to
"certain petty offenses." Even where the nature of the offense puts the
defendant on notice of its criminal nature, allowing a defense is justifiable
where a lack of notice exists for some other reason. In the Barker cases, for
example, the crimes were so close to burglary that a person of normal
conscience and understanding would have been on notice to avoid the
proscribed behavior.88 The fact that Hunt was a former CIA agent, that
the burglars had worked for him, that they were assured that the
break-ins were related to national security, and that Hunt was apparently a
public official and had an office in the White House may, however, have
been enough to convince the burgulars that Hunt had the authority
to approve their actions. If so, then the notice of criminality they would
ordinarily have had from the nature of their actions might arguably have
been negated by this additional information.8 9
85. See HALL, supra note 25, at 393-94.
86. It is also worth noting that Hall's "principles of legality" should be the same
for civil and criminal law. By allowing a defense where a mistake of civil law negates
mens rea, the defendant's belief as to the nature of the civil law supplants the actual
law for the purposes of that criminal action as much as any mistake of criminal law.
87. HALL, supra note 25, at 404. See generally id. at 404-08.
88. See generally note 8 supra.
89. Determining whether this notice of criminality existed or was negated by
other facts seems a question of fact that could be determined by a jury in the same
fashion that a jury makes other determinations of fact.
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Hall has attempted to narrow ignorantia juris by eliminating two
classes ordinarily treated as exceptions to the rule by arguing that they are
not truly cases of ignorantiajuris, and by creating his own limited exception
to the rule. His attempt respecting all three suffers from the same objections
he raised against allowing an ignorantiajuris defense, that law is to have
an objective meaning. He also avoids the question of societal condemnation
of certain types of acts by stating that the notion of culpability does not
apply to two of his classes. The three classes of cases categorized by Hall as
exceptions to the general rule, or outside of mistake and ignorance of law,
instead establish a minimal framework for allowing a defense in the
situation where no reasonable person would have been placed on notice of
the potential culpability of his act, or else that notice was negated by
reasonable reliance on some authority or other additional information.9
In The Common Law,9 1 Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested a more
pragmatic basis for the traditional rule:
Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good . . . . It is no
doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not
have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all
would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to
make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly
92
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.
Holmes, more than the other major commentators refusing any defense
discussed above, creates a test that weighs the preservation of the criminal
justice system against the interests of the individual. He concludes that the
interests of society must predominate because permitting an excuse would
encourage ignorance of the law. Two analytic flaws undermine the breadth
of this conclusion. Holmes indicates that individual and societal interests
must be balanced in determining whether a mistake or ignorance of law
defense should be allowed, but gives no reason for concluding that this
balance must be struck in a fashion precluding a defense. He fails to
90. Those crimes with a mens rea allowing a defense where the accused claims he
was ignorant or mistaken as to the law irrespective of the reasonableness of the
ignorance or mistake may indicate a justification for a broader defense.
Hall allows a mistake of law defense to be asserted in these three classes of
cases despite the fact that the law in each is ultimately no more or less "unknowable"
than the law in other cases where no defense is allowed. Thus, Hall implicitly
recognizes that the law may not be predicted by a rational person under some
circumstances. By recognizing that a defense may exist in such circumstances Hall
indicates that the weakness in Austin's argument inheres in his own argument as
well. The law may be ultimately unknowable, and yet a person may still be on notice
that his actions may be criminal, thereby being obligated to attempt to determine the
legality of his proposed behavior before acting. When nothing indicates illegality, or
the possibility of illegality is negated for a reasonable person, however, arguments
that the law is ultimately unknowable do not preclude the possibility of a workable
defense.
91. HOLMES, supra note 33.
92. Id. at 41.
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recognize, moreover, that in our society certain interests of the individual
have been adopted as societal interests. Viewing these interests as societal
as well as individual shifts the balance more favorably towards allowance
of the defense. The societal interest in discouraging ignorance or mistake of
law is largely satisfied when this ignorance or mistake is measured against
an objective standard.
The danger that proscribed behavior may increase arises any time a
defense is allowed, for the availability of a defense decreases the likelihood
that the prohibited behavior will be punished, thereby decreasing the
deterrent effect of such punishment. Certain defenses are not allowed when
the dangers of certain forms of prohibited behavior are too great to
tolerate. 93 This increased danger, however, justifies only a limitation upon
the circumstances in which an excuse normally allowed can be asserted
rather than a general rule barring the excusing condition. 94 Were this not so
most defenses would not be allowed.
Holmes admits that an ignorance or mistake of law defense is often
justifiable. This conclusion seems correct, for the person who is either
ignorant or mistaken as to the law can be viewed as either not blameworthy
or as having had no choice between acting in conformity with or violating
the law. Both these justifications underlie a great number of defenses
ordinarily permitted, and accepting Holmes' conclusion that no mistake or
ignorance of law defense should be allowed appears to militate against
allowing any of these defenses. This is particularly true when the defense of
mistake of fact is asserted, for a person interested in avoiding punishment
would be as encouraged to avoid learning facts that might indicate that his
actions are illegal as he would be to avoid learning the law making his
actions illegal. Mistake of fact defenses, as well as other defenses, are
allowed despite this danger, and the system of criminal justice does not
appear to have been damaged by allowing it. Even if the potential for such
damage exists in allowing a mistake or ignorance of law defense, limiting its
application in those situations where the danger seems to exist appears
more rational than prohibiting its assertion under all circumstances.
A person who is on notice of his act's potential criminality has a strong
disincentive to finding out his legal responsibilities, and arguably no
93. A necessity defense is not permitted for particularly heinous crimes. See
PERKINS, supra note 3, at 957-61.
94. In Hall & Seligman, supra note 2, at 648, the authors suggest that extending
Holmes' theory to cover not only specific deterrence of the convicted individual but
also deterrence of a generalized ignorance of law throughout society would justify
denying a mistake or ignorance of law defense. One weakness afflicts this position:
knowledge of law, or at least general impressions of what is and is not permitted by
society, is built up by the accretion of decisions rather than by single cases. If a case
is so attention-grabbing that most members of society are aware of its consequences,
then they will be aware of the relevant behavior and its illegality. If, on the other
hand, an ignorance or mistake of law defense is allowed in an ordinary case, it will
not destroy the ultimate effect of this accretion of cases on the public's behavior, for
the defense will not be raised in all cases, and will not be accepted in all of those cases
in which it is raised. At most it will have a miniscule delaying effect on the
development of public attitudes toward certain forms of behavior.
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defense should be allowed when this notice exists. Where no reasonable
person in the same position would be on notice of possible criminal liability,
however, Holmes' assertion that allowing a defense would encourage
ignorance of the law is not valid. A reasonable man standard would require
that a person consider all the information available to him, and that he
come to the same conclusion with respect to the potential illegality in his
intended actions that a rational person with this information would reach. If
a rational man with access to this same information would conclude that no
potential illegality existed, then ignorance of the law would be neither
encouraged nor discouraged, for information indicating the need to
investigate the state of the law would not exist. If notice of potential
illegality did exist but an investigation was made that would satisfy a
reasonable man that this potential did not truly exist, then the possibility of
acting illegally has again disappeared from the person's mind, and no
further investigation would appear necessary. In any case, the danger that
encouraging ignorance of the law will result from allowing a defense has
been defeated, for the person has already diligently investigated the state of
the law.
IV.

BARKER

I

AND BARKER

II

The judges advocating allowing a defense in Barker I and Barker H all
attempted to show that a mistake based upon reasonable or actual reliance
on a person in a position of apparent authority is so analogous to some
existing exception to the general rule (that no defense should be allowed)
that the justifications for those exceptions apply to the situations in BarkerI
and Barker II as well. No judge examined the justifications given for not
allowing a defense and attempted to determine whether they were valid, or
whether denying a defense in the Barker situations supported those
justifications deemed legitimate. Even Judge Bazelon, 95 who discussed the
various justifications given for not allowing a mistake of law defense,
framed the issue when a mistake of law defense should be allowed in terms
of whether an exception to the general rule might be analogized to the case
of the Watergate burglars. He expressly rejected a solution based upon an
examination of the justifications given for not allowing a defense. 96 In order
to determine whether a defense should be allowed, however, an inquiry
should have been made into whether the defense is legitimate. In the Barker
cases a more detailed examination by the judges of the justifications for the
exceptions to the general rule denying a defense might have led them to
recognize a defense similar to that proposed in this Comment.
A.

Opinions Favoring a Defense

1.

Judge Bazelon's Opinion

In Barker I, after his discussion of the justifications for not allowing an
ignorance or mistake of law defense, Judge Bazelon compared the reason for
95. Barker 1, 514 F.2d 208, 228-32 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring).
96. Id. at 233.
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allowing a mistake of law defense under the circumstances of that case to
the justification advanced for permitting a mistake of fact defense. He
distinguished mistakes of fact and law by advancing a traditional
explanation that mistakes of fact are peculiar to a particular incident and
often cannot be foreseen and prevented through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. 97 Without examining the validity of this position with respect to a
person's ignorance of the existence of a particular law, he contended that
this distinction is weakened when "applied to reasonable mistakes in the
98
application of legal principles to a particularfactual situation."
Judge Bazelon is correct in his initial contention that the distinction
between mistakes of fact and mistakes in the application of legal principles
to a particular factual situation is weak, but the new distinction this
analogy implicitly creates between ignorance of law and the application of
law to a particular factual situation is equally artificial. Neither reasonable ignorance of a law nor reasonable misapplication of this law in a particular situation by definition can be prevented through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Judge Bazelon's second reason for analogizing mistakes of fact and mistakes in the application of law to a factual situation the fact that both such mistakes are peculiar to a particular incident creates a legitimate reason for distinguishing mistakes in applying the law
from ignorance of the law only if this limitation avoids problems of proof.
When a mistake of fact defense is raised, however, the jury is required to
determine whether or not the defendant actually perceived the facts in the
mistaken way he claims. As discussed previously, determining the
defendant's actual perception of these particular facts at the time of his
illegal act is as indeterminate a question as if his error were purely some
ignorance or mistake of law. Attempting to determine why the mistake of
fact was made could involve exploring the mistaken person's background in
an attempt to explain why he made his mistake to the same extent as if his
mistake were one of law. The only legitimate distinction between mistakes of
law and fact appears to be one based upon the unique character of law
rather than a distinction based upon the degree of difficulty in proving the
mistake.
Using this discussion of the similarity of mistakes of fact and mistakes
in the application of law to a factual situation as background, Judge
Bazelon then analogized the situation of the defendants in Barker I to that
of the defendants in People v. Weiss.9 9 The defendants in Weiss were asked
by a man who claimed to be a detective and who produced bogus evidence of
his authority to help him arrest a man he claimed was the kidnapper of the
Lindbergh baby. The man was not a detective, and the good samaritans who
aided him were convicted of kidnapping. On appeal the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals interpreted New York's kidnapping statute to include
as an element of the offense that the defendants not believe they had the
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938).

1977]

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

legal authority to act as they did. 100 Although Judge Bazelon recognized
that Weiss might be distinguished as a judicial construction of a statute
rather than the New York Court of Appeals' own determination of the
policies and justifications for allowing a defense, he pointed out that the
New York legislature's "recognition" of such a defense was a statement
reflecting such policies, and was as much a legitimate source of law as any
case law. 101 Both because the Barker I defense was factually indistinguishable from that in Weiss and because it involved a situation where distinctions
between fact and law were more "'nice than obvious'" in that the defense
depended on the authority of one who could reasonably be viewed as a
government agent, Judge Bazelon concluded that a defense should be
allowed.102

The rationale underlying a legislative enactment may well provide as
legitimate a source of law as the rationale underlying a case. If the rationale
is to be used as a source of law beyond the scope of the statute, however, no
reason exists for artificially limiting its application to one class of cases and
not extending it to another. Weiss makes no mention of any distinction
100. Id.
101. 514 F.2d at 234 (Bazelon; C. J., concurring).
102. Id. at 235. 'All three judges in Barker I used Weiss in an attempt to buttress
their arguments. Chief Judge Bazelon used it to blur the distinction between fact and
law. Id. at 234-35. Judge MacKinnon claimed that Weiss is solid authority for his
argument that the mistake in Barker I was one of fact. Id. at 242-43 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting). The court in Weiss made no attempt to characterize the mistake of the
defendants, who believed a bogus detective who asked them to help him arrest a
person he claimed was the Lindbergh kidnapper, as a mistake of fact. Instead, it
found that the mental element required by the kidnapping statute required that the
defendants not believe they had authority of law to act. 276 N.Y. at 389, 12 N.E.2d at
515.

Judge Wilkey agreed that Weiss could be used as authority in this case despite
the fact that the mental elements of the crimes charged in Barker I were fulfilled. 514
F.2d at 265-68. He argued that the reason for allowing the defense was that people
should not be discouraged from aiding public officials. Id. at 267-68. However, no
mention of this purpose was made in Weiss. If Weiss involves anything more than the
interpretation of a statute, the opinion seems to reflect a feeling that the defendants
might really have believed the bogus detective's story, and thus not be truly
blameworthy:
No matter how doubtful the credibility of these defendants may be or how
suspicious the circumstances may appear, we cannot say as matter of law [sic]
that, even in so strong a case as this for the prosecution, the jury was not
entitled to consider the question whether defendants in good faith believed
that they were acting with authority of law.
276 N.Y. at 389-90, 12 N.E.2d at 515-16. See generally id. at 386-87, 12 N.E.2d at 515.
This view seems to reflect the general approach to crimes with a "wilful" or other
mental element. Perkins determined that these elements were negated where a
mistake of law led to commission of a malum prohibitumoffense. PERKINS, supra note
3, at 780-81. In fact, this determination seems to reflect a court's opinion as to the
likelihood that a person in a particular situation should have been aware that he was
breaking the law. If valid, this defense should not be restricted to crimes requiring a
wilful element, but should reach the jury when evidence has been advanced that a
person was not on notice of the potential illegality of his actions, or that this notice
had been destroyed by additional information he had received.
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between different types of mistakes of law. The Weiss Court based the
defense it "found" in the statute upon the defendants' belief in his authority
to act as he did.103 Although the opinion in Weiss no more discusses the
reasonableness of the defendants' beliefs than the nature of the mistake
made, a more probable basis for the legislature's, or the court's, conclusion
would be the fact that a reasonable person might well believe that a person
with the indicia of public authority was requesting him to act in a lawful
fashion, and the trier of fact should be allowed to consider this possibility in
determining guilt or innocence. Rather than attempting to classify the
mistake as one of fact, or law, or a mixed mistake of fact and law, this
rationale goes to the reasonableness of the mistake, and favors extending a
defense whenever the ignorance or mistake was reasonable.
Judge Bazelon limits the scope of the defense he advocates both by
blurring the distinction between the mistake of law in Barker I and a
mistake of fact and by limiting the application of the rationale for the result
in Weiss to that case's facts. Judge Bazelon pointed out that distinctions
between law and fact may be more "'nice than obvious,' "104 but the source
of this language was a case in which the United States Supreme Court found
itself compelled to draw such a line. 105 If mistakes of fact and law are
distinguished because of policies relating to the nature of law, as contended
by Holmes,106 rather than because of problems of proof, 107 then drawing this
line is necessary whether or not the mistake is the application of the law to a
factual situation, for the state wishes to ensure that the law will be properly
applied. Rather than creating nice distinctions between mistakes of fact and
law, a more pertinent inquiry with respect to the nature of mistakes of law
would be the extent to which society's interest in having the law obeyed
precludes allowing a defense. Nor should Weiss be limited to its facts; the
case should be examined for its underlying justification. Both these inquiries
lead to an examination of the reasonableness of the mistake of law made by
the defendants - a reasonableness determined by whether Hunt's
assurances were sufficient to negate the burglars' notice that their actions
might be criminal.
2.

Judge MacKinnon's Dissent

Judge MacKinnon went farther than Judge Bazelon in Barker I,
arguing that "[i]t is possible to characterize appellants' mistake as a
103. 276 N.Y. at 386-87, 12 N.E.2d at 514.
104. 514 F.2d at 235 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring).
105. Local 761, Electr. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S.667, 674 (1961). The quotation referred to the need to draw a line between permissible "primary" and illegal
"secondary" disputes, strikes, or boycotts under § 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.
106. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
107. As discussed above, one factor peculiar to a mistake of fact situation is the
perception of the mistaken individual. Any attempt to determine the merits of a
mistake of fact defense may involve exploring the allegedly mistaken person's
background to the same extent as would be required if the mistake were one of law.
See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
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mistake of fact - i.e., a mistake as to the fact that all necessary
authorization for their activities had been obtained."' 108 The same arguments
against Judge Bazelon's attempt to analogize mixed mistakes of law and
fact to mistakes of fact apply even more strongely to an attempt to classify
such a mistake as one of fact.
Judge MacKinnon argued alternatively that the mistake in Barker I
might fit into either of two of the several exceptions to the general rule
denying a defense for a mistake of law. According to Judge MacKinnon,
either the crimes for which the Watergate burglars were charged'0 9 required
a special intent negatived by their mistake of law, or the rule did not apply
because the law respecting the situation in which the burglars found
themselves was unsettled, obscure, or susceptible of more than one
reasonable construction.' 10 Analogizing the situation of the Watergate
burglars to either of these exceptions may have some merit, but the
legitimacy of placing them within the exceptions is questionable. Barker
and his cohorts were charged with seven counts: two for second degree
burglary; two for endeavoring to intercept oral and wire communications;
two for willful, unlawful possession of bugs and wiretaps; and one for
conspiracy to commit all the above offenses."' The mens rea necessary for
second degree burglary or for endeavoring to intercept communications
would not appear to require that the defendants know they were acting
illegally, for in both cases the crime is defined in a fashion indicating that
the normal requirement for mens rea - an intent to commit the criminal act
irrespective of knowledge of its legality - is the only mental element
required for conviction." 2 Nor does the mental element required for
108. 514 F.2d at 241 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
109. The defendants were charged with
Count 1: Conspiracy to commit the crimes charged in the other counts, a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
Count 2: Burglary, consisting of entry into the DNC to steal property of
another, a violation of 22 D.C. Code § 1801(b) (1973).
Count 3: Burglary, consisting of entry into the DNC with intent to
intercept "wire and oral communications;" as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2510
(1970), a violation of 22 D.C. Code § 1801(b).
Count 4: Endeavoring to intercept oral communications within the DNC,
a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2511. (1970).
Count 5: Endeavoring to intercept wire communications within the
DNC, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2511.
Count 6: Unlawful possession of devices for intercepting oral communications, a violation of 23 D.C. Code § 543(a) (1973).
Count 7: Unlawful possession of device for intercepting wire communications, a violation of 23 D.C. Code § 543(a).
514 F.2d at 212 n.5 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 243-44 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
111. See note 109 supra.
112. See 22 D.C. CODE § 1801(b) (Supp. 1970) (defining second degree burglary as
entry into an area "with intent to break and carry away any part thereof or any
fixture or other thing attached to or connected with the same, or to commit any
criminal offense"); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970) (defining the crime of "endeavoring to
intercept oral communications").
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conspiracy require knowledge of illegality: a criminal conspiracy may exist
where there is an agreement to do an act that, unknown to the parties, is a
crime.' 13 A stronger case can be made for contending that the mens rea
necessary to wilfully possess a wiretap device does not exist where a person
believes he acted legally. Perkins, for example, has concluded that
"wilfulness" can in some cases be interpreted to permit a defense based upon
a misconception of the law.' 14 The varying interpretations that have been
given "wilful," however, as well as the nature of the wiretapping offenses,
make it difficult to determine whether this offense fits into this category."1 5
Judge MacKinnon illustrated the second mistake of law exception he
believed applicable - the obscurity and uncertainty surrounding the
question when a wiretap was legal at the time of the Watergate break-in by pointing out that the executive branch of the federal government had
consistently argued that warrantless electronic surveillance in furtherance
of domestic as well as foreign national security was constitutional. 1 6 He
indicated that it was only after the Watergate break-in that the Supreme
117
Court rejected this argument.
Support for Judge MacKinnon's contention that the law must give
sufficient notice that the allegedly criminal conduct is illegal may be found
not only in the common law exception to the denial of a defense for
ignorance or mistake of law where the law is unsettled, obscure, or
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation," 8 but also in
constitutional due process requirements. Not only does the "void for
vagueness" doctrine require that a criminal statute give sufficient notice of
the behavior it prohibits," 9 but the Supreme Court has held that due process
even prohibits the application of court defined doctrines where insufficient
notice of their application existed at the time of the alleged crime. In Marks
v. United States,'21 the Supreme Court held that the more stringent
obscenity standard adopted by the Court could not be utilized to determine
Marks' criminal liability for actions performed prior to the adoption of that
test:
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers of the
legislature. . . and does not of its own force apply to the judicial branch
of the government . . . . But the principle on which the clause is based
113. See 514 F.2d at 266 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 678.
114. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 933-34.
115. See 514 F.2d at 266 n.70 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
116. See 514 F.2d at 243, 244 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
117. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Judge
MacKinnon noted that this opinion limited itself to domestic aspects of national
security surveillance. 514 F.2d at 243 n.15 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting).
118. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1961) (Warren, C. J.,
concurring) (refusal to allow a conviction under a statute where case law had placed a
gloss on the statute indicating an element of the crime that was later determined not
to exist).
119. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
120. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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- the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct
which will give rise to criminal penalties - is fundamental to our
concept of constitutional liberty . . . . As such, that right is protected
action by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
against judicial
21
Amendment.1
A lack of definition of the law relating to the legality of wire-tapping should
arguably lead to the same result.
. Two major problems exist with developing this analogy. First, Judge
MacKinnon rests his ambiguity argument upon the executive branch's
claims of authority, and reliance upon the pronouncements of executive or
administrative officials has been traditionally found not to provide grounds
for any defense. 122 Additionally, a defense predicated upon the fact that the
Supreme Court has not passed upon a particular issue cannot be unlimited,
for otherwise a defense would appear to be made out every time the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Since a writ of certiorari is granted only when the
Supreme Court finds some important question to decide, one might argue
that by definition this means that there is an ambiguity in the law. Under
Judge MacKinnon's analysis this ambiguity would mandate a defense. This
result is obviously absurd, and a defense is granted only when notice of an
act's criminality is not given by the law. Judge MacKinnon does not
indicate in, his analysis when this notice is not given.
Judge MacKinnon's attempts to fit the Watergate break-in within an
exception to the general rule leads to almost arbitrary line drawing between
various types of "wilfulness" and between different shades of vagueness. In
both instances the more important question seems to be that apparently
underlying the Supreme Court's due process concerns: whether the person
was on notice of the potential that his act was criminal. One factor certainly
entering into this question is whether the crime is adequately defined, a
determination within the province of a judge. Other factors such as
surrounding circumstances or societal attitudes as to what is ordinarily
considered criminal can prevent the actor from obtaining notice as much as
a lack of legal definition. The same considerations of ability to choose to act
legally and fairness that militate for allowing a defense that the law does
not adequately define certain criminal behavior militate equally for allowing
a defense of mistake or ignorance of law due to the absence of notice of
criminality whenever circumstances indicate the legitimacy of such a claim.
Whether the circumstances of the Watergate break-in were sufficient to fit
that case within one of the two exceptions to the mistake of law doctrine
advanced by Judge MacKinnon, the policies underlying these exceptions
indicate that the trier of fact should have been allowed to consider whether a
reasonable person in the position of the burglars would have been ignorant
of or mistaken as to the potential criminality of their actions.
121. Id. at 191-92.
122. See, e.g., Automobile Club v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Federal Crop Ins.
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456
(1949). But see Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951); State v. Davis, 63 Wis. 2d 75,
216 N.W.2d 31 (1974).
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Judge Wilkey's Dissent in Barker I

Judge Wilkey stated in Barker I that "if [the defendants] honestly and
reasonably believed the operation was lawful, their mistake of law should
give them a valid defense in this context."' 123 Authority for this position was
found in two sources: two cases in which a defense of entrapment was
allowed, 124 and the analogy to the situation where a person rendered
requested aid to a police officer and the aid was later found to be illegal, a
25
situation where a defense has been allowed.1
27
26
In Cox v. Lousiana1 and Raley v. Ohio, government officials led the
defendants to believe they were acting legally. In each case the Supreme
Court stated that the government had "entrapped" the defendants, but in
neither case did the Court look to the nature of the government action or the
predisposition of the defendants to commit the crime - traditional elements
of a federal entrapment defense. 2 Instead, the Court emphasized the
defendants' right to rely on the assurances of the government officials in the
circumstances surrounding each case.
Neither the defense for aiding a policeman acting illegally nor the
"entrapment" defense found in Cox and Raley explicitly relies on the
reasonableness of reliance on such an authority symbol. However, the
reasonableness of reliance where a government official in a position to know
the law assured the criminal defendant of the legality of his action provides
a str6ng justification for the defense. When the person providing these
assurances is a police officer, an official charged with the enforcement of the
law, the likelihood that reliance is reasonable becomes even greater. The fact
that Judge Wilkey discussed two factors as making the Watergate burglars'
mistake reasonable - Hunt's apparent authority and the disputed legality
of similar searches engaged in for national security purposes' 2 9 strengthens the inference that the reasonableness of the defendants' beliefs
that they were not acting illegally underlay Judge Wilkey's analogy of their
situation to two other mistake of law situations where a defense is
permitted. 13° If the underlying justification for allowing a defense is the
reasonableness of the legal error, however, the defense should be extended to
all situations where the ignorance or mistake of law is reasonable.

123. Barker I, 514 F.2d at 268 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 268 n.75.

125. See id. at 267-68 & n.74.
126. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
127. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
129. 514 F.2d at 268-69 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
130. Judge Wilkey also used People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938) to
buttress his argument that a defense should be allowed. See note 102 supra. For a
discussion of the support Weiss gives to examining the reasonableness of a mistake of
law in determining whether a defense should be allowed, see note 103 and
accompanying text supra.
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Judge Wilkey's Concurrence in Barker II

In Barker II, Judge Wilkey formulated an ignorantiajuris defense in
similar reasonableness terms, but tied his justification more closely to the
exception allowed for a police officer accused of false arrest who was acting
under an invalid warrant when he made the arrest. 131 He continued to
analogize the situation of Barker and his compatriots to that of a person
132
aiding a police officer whose actions are later found to be illegal,
broadening this analogy to encompass other officials whom the state wishes
obeyed. 33 From these situations he derived a policy reason for allowing a
defense to those involved in the actual Ellsberg break-in: under certain
circumstances there is a public interest in encouraging obedience to public
officials, and this interest is served by permitting a mistake of law defense
34
where the mistake is reasonable1
Judge Wilkey's emphasis on the importance of encouraging obedience to
public authorities obscures the fact that encouraging too ready an obedience
to authority can cause its own problems. The interest in individual
obedience to government officials must be tempered by consideration of the
greater degree of harm a person can inflict when cloaked in a blanket of
official authority than when acting in a purely private capacity. 135
Consequently, the interest in obedience seems vitiated where the official
authorization appears unreasonable, for society's interests are not furthered
when the behavior sanctioned by the authority is so suspect as to appear
illegal despite that sanction. At the same time, society does seem to have an
interest in encouraging people to rely on official authority. This interest does
not exist simply because an official is a source of authority. Rather, it exists
because a person in a position of authority is more likely, within the scope
of his authority, to know what behavior is legal and what is illegal. If the
reasonableness of the reliance on a public official is the actual justification
for allowing a mistake or ignorance of law defense based on this authority,
however, no reason exists for allowing the assertion of a defense in this
situation and not allowing it in any other situation where some source of
information indicates that certain conduct is legal. Perhaps a public
official's statement respecting the legality of a particular course of conduct
is more inherently trustworthy than reliance on most other information
indicating the legality of certain behavior, but trustworthiness indicates the
degree to which a reasonable person would rely on the information rather
than some inherent difference in the nature of the information conveyed. No
matter what factor indicates that certain conduct is legal or potentially
illegal, the test should be whether, in light of this and all other available
information, a reasonable person would be on notice as to the potential of
illegality in his actions. This determination should be the result of a
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Barker II, 546 F.2d 940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wilkey, J., concurring).
Id. at 948.
Id. at 948-49.
Id.
See id. at 958 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
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weighing of all information by the trier of fact, and the degree of
trustworthiness inherent in some particular fact would be one of the factors
considered in this weighing.
After stating his justification for a defense, Judge Wilkey proceeded to
determine what conditions would support a mistake of law defense:
The trial judge can justify [an instruction not allowing a mistake of law
defense] in this context only if there is no legal possibility of equating
the reliance of Barker and Martinez on Hunt's apparent authority with
the reliance of a police officer on a judicial warrant subsequently held
36
invalid.'
From the above discussion it would appear that the defense advocated by
Judge Wilkey would apply whenever a person reasonably relied on
information from an official indicating that certain behavior is legal. Judge
Wilkey further indicated that the defendants would be required to show both
"(1) facts justifying their reasonable reliance on Hunt's apparent authority
and (2) a legal theory on which to base a reasonable belief that Hunt
possessed such authority."' 137 He then proceeded to find that both of these
conditions had been met. 138 Both facts justifying reliance and the existence
of a legal theory, however, are factors going to the reasonableness of a
person's belief in the legality of his actions. Either separately or in
combination they might indicate a reasonable belief in the legality of one's
actions. No reason exists for requiring both as a prerequisite to the existence
of a defense. 139 Moreover, Judge Wilkey gave no reason for saying that these
two requirements would have to be met either by Barker and Martinez or by
a police officer relying upon an invalid warrant. Requiring a police officer to
articulate a legal theory beyond a general belief as to the legality of his
actions, for example, would virtually negate the function of the judge in
issuing the warrant.
Judge Wilkey analogized the Ellsberg break-in to two mistake of law
defenses, and provided a policy justification for allowing a defense in these
situations. Again, the underlying rationale for the defense appears to be the
reasonableness of the mistake made, a justification that would underlie a
defense far broader than that advocated by Judge Wilkey.
136. Id. at 949 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The requirement of a legal theory seems particularly weak, for it implies that
the defendant consulted the statute or case law before acting. In fact, contacting some
figure in authority would be the only action a person would ordinarily take. The
existence of a reasonable legal theory might indicate that the mores of society have
not yet determined whether certain conduct is prohibited. This would, however, go to
the reasonableness of believing the official. It would not constitute an independent
element to be shown before an excuse should be recognized.
If the legal theory were sufficiently reasonable, however, the state's failure to
sufficiently define the prohibited behavior to enable a person to have the capacity to
act in conformity with its dictates might provide an alternate basis for acquittal. See
note 55 and accompanying text supra.

1977]
5.

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

Judge Merhige's Concurrence in Barker II

Judge Merhige developed his version of a defense for the Ellsberg
burglars by examining first the fear that allowing a mistake of law defense
would result in "universal pleas of ignorance of the law that would
constantly pose confusing and, to a great extent insolvable issues of fact to
juries and judges, and bog down our adjudicative system."' 140 Instead of
examining the validity of these objections, Judge Merhige went on to state
that exceptions to the general rule denying a mistake or ignorance of law
defense "have developed in situations where its policy foundations have
failed to apply with strength, and alternative policy consideration[s]
strongly favor a different result."' 141 Finding such a situation embodied in
section 2.04(3)(b) of the Model Penal Code, 142 a section granting a defense to
criminal prosecution where a person reasonably relied on certain classes of
official statements of the law, he reformulated its language to permit a
defense
if, and only if, an individual (1) reasonably, on the basis of an objective
standard, (2) relies on a (3) conclusion or statement of law (4) issued by
an official charged with interpretation, administration, and/or enforcement responsibilities in the relevant legal field. The first three issues are
of course of a factual nature that may be submitted to a jury; the fourth
is a question of law as it deals with interpretations of the parameters of
legal authority.

1 43

Although Judge Merhige recognized the potential applicability of his
proposed defense to the Barker II defendants, whether Barker and Martinez
could fall within its scope is open to question. Judge Merhige correctly
pointed out that the executive branch of the federal government is vested
with primary responsibility for national security, and that decisions of its
officials on the extent of their legal authority deserve some deference from
140. 546 F.2d at 954 (Merhige, J., concurring). This contention has been treated
and its validity questioned in this Comment's discussions of Selden and Austin, see
notes 64 to 70 and accompanying test supra, Hall see notes 71 to 90 and
accompanying text supra, and Holmes, see notes 91 to 94 and accompanying text
supra. In simplistic terms, it can be met by pointing out that questions of ignorance or
mistake of law are no more or less indeterminate than other questions of fact faced by
juries and judges, and these questions have been solved without destroying our
adjudicative system. A defense should be allowed to the extent that the arguments on
this point advanced in this Comment are accepted.
141. Barker II, 546 F.2d at 955 (Merhige, J., concurring).
142. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a
prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: ... (b) he acts in
reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward
determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other
enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion, or judgment; (iii) an administrative
order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public
officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation,
administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.04(3)(b) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962).

143. 546 F.2d at 955 (Merhige, J., concurring).
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the public. 144 Despite the national security element in this case one can
argue that the relevant legal field in which the official sanctioning the
action taken in this case must have operated would be criminal law
enforcement rather than national security. 145 A person charged with
intelligence gathering might be expected to be informed of the scope of his
authority, and therefore know when he and his subordinates were acting
legally. Knowing the scope of his authority does not necessarily mean that
he is also charged with the "interpretation, administration, and/or
enforcement" of the law relating to defenses that might be raised where his
subordinates have violated the law even where these defenses are allegedly
related to the scope of his authority. These functions are traditionally
performed by the police, the prosecutor, and the judiciary. Judge Merhige
himself seems to recognize this by making the question of the scope of the
authorizing official's authority a question of law. 146 Moreover, Judge
Merhige's formulation of the defense requires that the official have not
merely the apparent authority to interpret, administer, and/or enforce the
law, but in fact have the actual authority to perform one of these
functions. 47 Even if Hunt was entitled to "interpret, administer, and/or
enforce" the law relating to the scope of his authority, nothing indicates that
his legal authority extended to authorizing such actions as the Ellsberg or
Watergate break-ins.
Even if the circumstances of the Ellsberg defendants would not allow
them to assert the defense enunciated by Judge Merhige, the policy
justifications Judge Merhige advanced for allowing the defense he proposed
would still favor allowing them to assert a mistake of law defense. Three
such justifications were presented. First, the defense would not encourage
ignorance of the law because it requires an affirmative effort to determine
the law as a prerequisite to its assertion. Second, its assertion would be
neither so universal nor so abnormally confusing to the fact finder as to
discompose the judicial process. Finally, it advances the policy of fostering
48
obedience to the decisions of authority figures in the governing structure.1
If Hunt reasonably appeared to the defendants to fall within the class of
law-interpreting officials, it is unclear why a defense should be denied them
in light of these justifications for a defense even if Hunt lacked actual
authority. 49 An effort to determine the law would presumably continue as a
requirement so long as the potential for illegality was apparent to a
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 957.
See generally id. at 968-69 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
See id. at 956 (Merhige, J., concurring).
See note 142 supra.
546 F.2d at 956 (Merhige, J., concurring).
The policy is limited by the actual existence of an appropriate "official(s)" and
does not support an abrogation of the policies behind the general mistake of
law rule if an individual places his or her reliance, though reasonable, in a
stranger to public office erroneously believing him to be an official. Similarly,
the defense does not extend to reliance on individuals, who although
employed in a public capacity, have no interpretative or administrative
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reasonable person, vitiating the danger of encouraging ignorance of the law.
The scope of inquiry would remain limited, reducing the danger of
confusing, open-ended inquiries that might discompose the judicial process.
Finally, if a person, either inside or outside the government, reasonably
appears to have authority in a field relevant to the behavior he tells the
defendant is legal, then the policy of fostering obedience to certain officials
is frustrated by not permitting reliance on such a person as much as it is by
not permitting reliance on a person actually having such authority. Not
allowing a defense in such circumstances places a person in a position
where he will be subject to criminal punishment even if he reasonably
concludes on the basis of all available information that the person with
whom he is dealing has the authority he claims to have. Requiring that the
person relied upon actually be an official discourages reliance on true
officials for, no matter how apparent that official's authority may be, the
person who is asked to rely upon that authority will have to weigh the
possibility that the official is an imposter and that his reliance on the
official's apparent authority may result in a criminal sentence.
In any case, the justifications advanced by Judge Merhige for allowing
a defense of limited scope mask the justifications for allowing the broader
defense proposed in this Comment. Two of Judge Merhige's justifications
for allowing his limited defense are in fact responses to the arguments first
advanced by Holmes and Austin against allowing a mistake or ignorance of
law defense: encouraging ignorance of the law and problems of proof. The
third is the independent policy justification also advanced by Judge Wilkey
of encouraging obedience to public officials. Each of these justifications is
open to question. Ignorance of the law is not encouraged when some
objective standard of care must be met before a defense is allowed, while
equally complicated problems of proof are faced and overcome in our
criminal justice system at the present time. Finally, any policy of
encouraging reliance on public officials is faced by the danger to individual
liberty that encouraging such reliance might create. Encouraging reliance
on the statements of public officials ultimately appears to rest on the fact
that reliance on official statements is ordinarily reasonable because an
official's position and knowledge makes his statement likely to be true. If the
basis for allowing a defense where a public official has misled a person as to
the law is the reasonableness of reliance on official statements, however, the
only thing distinguishing it from other factors indicating why a mistake of
law was made is the degree to which it indicates the mistake's reasonableness. Weighing the value of evidence in this fashion traditionally falls
within the province of the trier of fact. The effect of the defense as
formulated by Judge Merhige is to limit the jury's determination of the
reasonableness of an individual's belief in the legality of his actions to one
situation where the likelihood that the belief was reasonable is particularly
high. Unless the issue of reasonableness is beyond the ability of a jury to
responsibilities in the area associated with the legal concepts involved in the
mistaken opinion or decision.
Id. at 956 (Merhige, J., concurring).

440
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decide - a conclusion difficult to reach in light of the fact that juries pass
upon this issue in every negligence case - no reason appears to exist for
preventing a jury from passing upon the question where the reasonableness
of the defendant in believing he acted without violating the law is called into
question. 15
6.

Synthesis of Opinions Advocating a Defense

Despite the different approaches taken to a mistake of law defense in the
Barker cases by Judges Bazelon, MacKinnon, Wilkey, and Merhige, a theme
seems to run through all their opinions: if the defendants in the two cases
believed their actions were legal, and if this belief was reasonable, a defense
should be allowed. Judges argued that the justifications for denying a
defense were mitigated or that the alternate policy of encouraging obedience
to government officials tipped the balance between allowing and not
allowing a defense in favor of recognizing an exception to the general rule
denying a defense. In each opinion, however, the weakening of the rationale
for not allowing a defense in the situation of the Barker defendants and the
apparent strength of the alternate policy justification seem to reduce to
arguments that equally support allowing a defense in any situation where a
defendant's ignorance or mistake of law was reasonable. Some opinions
only required actual belief on the part of the defendants that their actions
were legal."' Others required that their belief that they acted legally be
reasonable. 152 In both the opinions requiring actual belief and those
requiring reasonable belief, however, the potential reasonableness of the
defendants' belief was stressed either to show that they actually believed
their actions legal, or to show that the belief was reasonable. Some of the
judges imposed additional requirements on their defenses. In each case,
these additional factors were ones that went to the reasonableness of the
defendant's belief that he was acting legally.
This emphasis on reasonableness and factors indicating reasonableness
throughout all the opinions advocating some sort of defense indicates that,
at a minimum, the judges believed that it would be in some fashion unfair to
punish an individual who reasonably concluded his behavior was legal
because he relied upon some official authority. Two factors might explain
this apparent belief. First, the defendants in Barker I and Barker II could
arguably be considered not blameworthy. They were footsoldiers who acted
as they did in obedience to Hunt, a man with White House and intelligence
connections of which they were aware, and whom they believed they had
good reason to trust.1 3 Further, this information about Hunt arguably
150. The same arguments militate against limiting mistake of law defenses to the
formulations adopted by the Model Penal Code discussed in notes 18 and 19 and
accompanying text supra.
151. See Barker I, 514 F.2d at 227-48 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring and MacKinnon,
J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 248-70 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Barker II, 546 F.2d at 943-57 (Wilkey
and Merhige, JJ., concurring).
153. See note 8 supra and cases cited therein.
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vitiated the defendants' suspicions that their behavior might be illegal to the
point where a reasonable person with the information they had would
conclude that their actions did not have sufficient potential of criminality to
warrant further investigation. In fact, further inquiry might be seen by their
superiors as a breach of confidence, perhaps even a criminal breach of
confidence. This could be found to negate notice of potential illegality,
leaving the defendants with no capacity to choose between acting legally
and illegally. As discussed previously, 15 4 both the potential that the
behavior of the defendants in the given circumstances might not be found
blameworthy and the potential that they might be found without the
capacity to choose to act in a lawful manner provide strong justifications for
allowing a defense to be asserted. Blameworthiness underlies the very
concept of crime, while the capacity to choose how to act underlies our
governmental system's concept of the relationship between individual and
state. Where two such policies support allowing a reasonable mistake of law
defense and the arguments opposing the defense do not appear to justify
denying such a defense, the defense should be allowed.
B.

Denying a Defense: Judge Leventhal's Dissent in Barker II

Unlike the other judges whose opinions are discussed in this Comment,
Judge Leventhal concluded that no defense should be allowed in Barker
11.155 In that part of his opinion discussing the question whether such a
defense might be asserted by the defendants Judge Leventhal first examined
the general rule denying a defense and concluded that no defense should be
allowed unless the defendants fit within some approved exception to the
general rule. 15 6 He then examined various exceptions to the rule proffered as
covering situations analogous to that of the defendants. 15 7 Having
concluded that the circumstances of Barker and Martinez did not fit within
any of these exceptions, or within any other defense the defendants had
158
proffered, he contended that they should not be allowed any defense.
1.

Ignorance or Mistake of Law in General

Judge Leventhal opened his discussion of the general rule that no
defense is ordinarily allowed for mistake or ignorance-of law by observing
that the Supreme Court has long rejected a defense for mistake of law,
refusing to recognize a defense even where the mistake reflected no
subjective moral blameworthiness on the defendants' parts. 15 9 He buttressed
154. See notes 40 to 63 and accompanying text supra.
155. See Barker II, 546 F.2d at 957-73 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 963-66.
157. See id. at 966-69.
158. See id. at 971-73.
159. Id. at 963-64. Judge Leventhal's sources for these propositions, however,
indicate that the Supreme Court may not uphold a conviction where it is convinced
that a person is not on notice of the potential that his actions may be blameworthy. In
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1959), a woman was convicted under a Los
Angeles statute requiring any person convicted of an offense punishable as a felony
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this by pointing out that the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
excludes ignorance of law from its definition of culpability unless the offense
or the Code explicitly provides otherwise.' 6°
Judge Leventhal is correct in stating that the Supreme Court has used
language indicating that it would not recognize a defense where only a
mistake of law was asserted. It is interesting to note that the case Judge
Leventhal cited for this proposition, Lambert v. California,'61 allowed a
defense in a situation where the defendant was not put on notice of the
potential criminality of her inaction. 162 The cases cited for the proposition
that a mistake or ignorance of law defense has not been recognized even
when the mistake refutes any subjective moral blameworthiness in the
offender' 63 tend to fall into the category of "public welfare" offenses,
statutory crimes having no mens rea requirement because of the importance
of some public policy those offenses are designed to enhance. 6 4 Even so,
some of these cases referred to the fact that the defendants should have been
on notice as to the possibility that their behavior might be illegal.' 65 Thus,
the Supreme Court authority cited by Judge Leventhal would not preclude
either the creation or expansion of exceptions to the general rule denying a
defense, or the allowance of a mistake and ignorance of law defense utilizing
an objective standard to judge the defendant's beliefs and behavior.
Judge Leventhal next discussed the antiquity of the doctrine denying
any ignorance or mistake of law defense, pointing out that minds such as
Holmes and Austin had grappled with the conflicting interests of the person
unjustly convicted because of some mistake of law and the interests of
society, and that these minds had concluded that recognizing a mistake of
in California and who was to be or remain in Los Angeles for more than five days to
register with the police. Id. at 226. Overturning the conviction, the Court said:
circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of
registration are completely lacking. At most the ordinance is but a law
enforcement technique designed for the convenience of law enforcement
agencies through which a list of the names and addresses of felons then
residing in a given community is compiled. The disclosure is merely a
compilation of former convictions already publicly recorded in the jurisdiction
where obtained. Nevertheless, this appellant on first becoming aware of her
duty to register was given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its
penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent.
Id. at 229. The Court emphasized the fact that Lambert's crime was passive; she had
merely failed to register - a criminal act. Nonetheless, the same analysis applies in
any case where a person is not on notice as to the potential criminality of his act. But
see 355 U.S. at 230-32 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Existence or absence of knowledge
of potential criminality depends on the facts and circumstances of every individual
case. Thus, it seems akin to other questions of fact determined by juries.
160. 546 F.2d at 964 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
161. 355 U.S. 225 (1959).
162. See note 159 supra.
163. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971);
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
164. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933); note 41
supra.
165. See note 41 supra.
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law defense would both encourage ignorance of the law and interfere with
its enforcement because a claim of ignorance could be easily made and
would be difficult to prove.' 66 His argument appears to be an amalgam of
Austin's arguments respecting problems of proof and Holmes' argument
that the defense would encourage ignorance of the law. In addition, Judge
Leventhal advanced a third argument similar to that of Jerome Hall: that
allowing an ignorance or mistake of law defense would leave criminal
statutes in suspense where their interpretation has not been authoritatively
settled. 167 Each of these arguments has been discussed in detail above.' 68
Problems of proof are not insurmountable, for the courts solve equally openended problems, and can in any case be limited by imposing an objective
standard on the defense. Ignorance of the law is not encouraged when the
ignorance is measured against an objective standard of reasonableness.
This same requirement of some indicia of reasonableness would prevent
suspension of untested criminal statutes, for so long as a reasonable person
recognized the potential of illegality in his actions the defendant would be
denied a defense. If the statute would not put a reasonable person on notice
of this potential, then it would probably either be found void for vagueness,
fall into a traditional mistake of law exception for criminal statutes open to
two reasonable constructions, or be construed so as to preclude liability
under the rule of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be
construed strictly in any case.
In the final paragraphs of his general discussion of mistake of law,
Judge Leventhal states that on balance the interests of society outweigh the
hardship to the individual of an unjust conviction, and that such harsh
convictions can be ameliorated or avoided by such judicial and prosecutorial
tools as light sentencing and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.' 6 9 In
order for this balance to be struck, however, some societal interest must be
shown to be violated, and this violation must be so severe as to overcome
society's strong interest in acting in a fair and just fashion towards its
members. None of the interests emphasized in Judge Leventhal's opinion
appear to be adversely affected by permitting a defense where a reasonable
person would either not be on notice as to the potential illegality in his
actions, or would conclude that no such potential existed. In the absence of
some other societal interest, nothing would appear to bar allowing such a
defense.
Judge Leventhal suggests such an interest in the last sentence of his
general discussion of mistake of law. Judges Wilkey and Merhige discussed
166. 546 F.2d at 964-65 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 965.
168. See notes 64 to 94 supra.
169. 546 F.2d at 965 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). The possibility that punishment
can be mitigated, however, cannot be used as a justification for doing away with any
excusing condition. If the primary distinction between criminal and civil penalties is
the judgment of guilt, then the possibility of mitigation seems an improper means of
avoiding the question whether to convict a person for a crime. The possibility of
mitigation should only be considered after it has been determined that a certain
condition should not be excusing.
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the importance of allowing some reliance on governmental officials. Unlike
them, Judge Leventhal emphasized the dangers inherent in allowing a
defense of mistake of law based upon reliance on government authority: "to
hold otherwise would be to ease the path of the minority of government
officials who choose, without regard to the law's requirements, to do things
their way, and to provide absolution at large for private adventurers
170
recruited by them."
Allowing a defense in every situation where mistake or ignorance of law
based upon reliance on governmental authority is asserted would create the
dangers Judge Leventhal fears. At the same time, denying a defense solely
because the defendant relied upon an official statement as to the law leads
to the equally dangerous result of discouraging people from obeying
governmental authorities for fear that their reliance on these officials, no
matter how reasonable, might lead to criminal conviction. The point at
which these two conflicting interests seem to balance is that of reasonableness: society's interest in having officials obeyed extends only to the point
where a reasonable person would believe the official's orders, requests, or
statements conformed with the law. The societal interest in people acting in
a fashion they reasonably believe conforms with the law, however, extends
beyond any interest in having officials obeyed. In fact, the only reason for
giving the statements of officials more credence than the statements of
others is because it is reasonable to believe that an official will be aware of
the law as it relates to his area of authority. This being so, a defense should
be allowed in any situation where a reasonable person would either not
know his actions were potentially illegal, or would be convinced that no such
potential of illegality existed.
2.

Exceptions to the General Denial of a Defense

Because Judge Leventhal opposed allowing a mistake of law defense
under the circumstances of Barker II, he was forced to distinguish the
defenses proposed by the Model Penal Code to which Judges Wilkey and
Merhige analogized. His criticism of their opinions is most legitimate with
respect to the way they developed these analogies. Despite this, an
examination of the rationales underlying these defenses supports the
conclusion that an ignorance or mistake of law defense utilizing an objective
reasonableness standard should be allowed.
a.

Good Faith Reliance on an Official's Authority

The Model Penal Code provides defenses for good faith reliance on an
official's authority to a person aiding a police officer making an illegal
arrest and to a soldier obeying unlawful military orders. 17 ' Judge Leventhal
found a justification for allowing this defense independent of the reasonableness of relying on the official's apparent authority in these cases; he stated
170. Id. at 965-66.
171. Id. at 966.
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that the person asserting the defense in each of these cases was under a duty
to act.' 72 Since society has no way to protect a person under a duty to act
without allowing a defense even in the absence of any inquiry by the actor
into the legality of the requested act, Judge Leventhal stated that a defense
must be allowed in the two situations where such a duty exists. 7 3 Since the
defendants in Barker II were under no duty to aid Hunt, and since there is
no compelling social interest in having people obey government officials in
extra-legal activities, Judge Leventhal concluded that they should not be
allowed a defense for relying on Hunt's authority. 174 Again he reiterated the
dangers of allowing a defense, pointing out that to make the defense a
matter of right would enhance the resources available to individual officers
planning illegal government activity.175
Although Judge Leventhal appears to be correct in saying that a duty
exists to aid a police officer,' 7 6 and that the justification ordinarily given for
allowing a defense to a person summoned to aid an officer is the existence of
this duty, 7 7 several factors indicate that this does not necessarily
undermine its value as an analogic basis for a mistake or ignorance of law
defense. First, the importance of the duty as a legal duty 78 appears to bear a
disproportionate relationship to the importance of the defense purportedly
based upon this duty. Numerous cases recognize the defense, 7 9 but there are
few cases in which a person was prosecuted for refusing to aid a peace
officer, i'0 and in only one of these was the defendant ultimately held
liable.'' When imposed by statute, moreover, the penalties for refusing to
172. Id..
173. Id. at 966-67.
174. Id. at 967.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., PERKINS, supra note 3, at 511; Note, Criminal Law - Requiring
Citizens to Aid a Peace Officer, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 159, 159-60 & nn.7 & 8 (1964).
Contra, Shawano Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 219 Wis. 513, 263 N.W. 590 (1935). The
vast majority of states have statutorily imposed penalties for refusing this aid. See 14
DE PAUL L. REV. at 160 & n.7.
177. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 83 Ala. 60, 3 So. 441 (1888) (criminal); Kagel v.
Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 119 N.W.2d 394 (1963) (civil).
178. The legal nature of the duty is stressed to distinguish it from the moral
obligation to aid a peace officer.
179. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 355 Mo. 916, 199 S.W.2d 338 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Martin, 7 Pa. Dist. Ct. 219 (1897); Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. (4 Wash.) 149 (1847); cases
cited in note 177 supra.
180. Town of Greenwood v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 158, 146 S.W. 109 (1912); People v.
Harter, 26 App. Div. 2d 651, 272 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1966); State v. Brown, 264 N.C. 191, 141
S.E.2d 311 (1919); State v. Ditmore, 177 N.C. 592, 99 S.E. 368 (1919).
181. State v. Ditmore, 177 N.C. 592, 99 S.E. 368 (1919). Other sources indicate the
rarity of such prosecutions. 14 DE PAUL L. REV. at 162 n.14 indicates that no one in
the State's Attorney's office of Cook County, Illinois, could remember such a
prosecution in 25 years. The Attorney General of Maryland, a state not imposing a
statutory duty, had to be asked whether such a crime existed under Maryland Law, 49
Op. Arr'Y GEN. 344 (1964) (the Attorney General concluded such a crime existed). The
practice commentary to N.Y. PENAL CODE ANN. § 195-10 (1975) indicates that
prosecutions for failing to aid a peace officer are rare.
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aid a police officer tend to be relatively small.1s2 This lack of enforcement,
coupled with relatively light penalties, indicates that the legal duty is not
considered particularly significant, thereby weakening the defense's
rationale. Despite this, courts are clearly willing to allow a defense. This
ready willingness to grant the defense, as well as courts' willingness 18to3
provide compensation for those injured while aiding peace officers,
indicates a desire to encourage such behavior for reasons other than the
existence of a duty. One such reason would necessarily be the reasonableness of the belief that a police officer would only request lawful aid, for the
purpose of having police officers is to uphold the law, and this purpose
would be defeated by a defense were there a substantial likelihood that
police officers would request assistance in performing illegal acts. The
likelihood that justifications for the defense other than the existence of a
duty exist is increased by the fact that a statutory crime existed in the four
cases where a person was prosecuted for refusing to aid a police officer, and
in three of those cases the court found a way to relieve the defendant from
criminal liability.
Second, even if the existence of a duty to act is the basis of the defense,
whether this ought to be its basis is open to question. The belief that a police
officer will request only legal aid from a bystander seems almost per se
reasonable, and belief in the legality of the requested action seems a
stronger justification than the existence of a legal duty. Even existence of a
moral duty is predicated on this reasonableness: a person would not feel
morally bound to aid a peace officer whom he believed to be acting illegally.
In fact, aiding a police officer in making a potentially illegal arrest might, if
anything, be viewed as a situation where a defense should not be allowed
because the arrestee is being deprived of liberty, one of the greatest
deprivations a government can inflict on its citizens.
Finally, the existence of a duty to aid a peace officer implicitly
presupposes that the creator of that duty believed it so reasonable that a
peace officer- will request only legal aid that it was willing to impose a duty
to act, a rarity in the law. As suggested above,18 4 the authority of a
policeman differs from other indicia of legality only in that a belief that
certain behavior is legal is more likely to be reasonable when based upon a
policeman's request to act than when based upon other factors. Such
questions of degree are susceptible to solution by triers of fact.
A soldier is under a duty to obey lawful orders, and consequently Judge
Leventhal's justification for a defense in the soldier's situation appears
tenable. Were this the true justification for allowing a defense, however, the
defense should be allowed whenever an order is obeyed, for otherwise the
soldier would have no protection when he unhesitatingly obeyed an order. In
fact a defense for obedience of military orders is allowed only when the
182. See 14 DE PAUL L. REV. at 161 & nn.ll to 13.
183. See, e.g., Monterey Co. v. Rader, 199 Cal. 221, 248 P. 912 (1926); Eaton v. Bern
Alillo Co., 46 N.M. 318, 128 P.2d 738 (1942); Village of Schofield v. De Lisle, 204 Wis.
84, 235 N.W. 396 (1931).
184. See notes 131 to 35 and accompanying text supra.
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belief that the orders were legal was reasonable under the given circumstances.

18 5

Rather than being based solely upon a duty to act, allowing a person
aiding an officer making an illegal arrest and a soldier obeying orders
defenses appears to be based upon two additional factors: the reasonableness of the belief that a police officer's request for aid in an arrest or a
superior's orders in the military are lawful, and the fact that neither
situation ordinarily allows the opportunity to question the legality of the
request or order. A person who aids a police officer does not have time to
consider whether he will be liable for making an unlawful arrest, nor does a
soldier have time to consider whether an order he has been given is legal.
The amount of time available to make a decision as to legality, however, can
be considered as merely another factor to be weighed in determining
whether an alleged belief as to the legality of an action was reasonable. 8 6 It
seems likely that the soldier obeying an order or the citizen aiding in an
arrest is given a defense because the apparent authority of the officer,
combined with the short time available to make a determination as to the
potential of illegality in the defendant's actions, made his reliance on
authority almost per se reasonable under the existing circumstances. The
weighing of such factors being one of the primary functions of a jury, the
assertion of a defense should be allowed any time a jury might conclude that
no reasonable person under the given circumstances would conclude that his
actions were illegal.
b.

Official Misstatements of Law

Because Judge Merhige based his concurrence upon the possibility that
the defendants relied on a government official's assurance of legality, Judge
Leventhal also addressed this exception to the general rule respecting a
mistake of law defense.' 8 7 Examining the Model Penal Code section creating
this defense, 88 he observed that a defense is allowed only where there is
reasonable reliance upon "an official interpretation of the public officer or
185. See United States v. Calley, 46 CMR 1131, 1182-83 (1973) and United States v.
Calley, 48 CMR 19, 27-29, 22 USCMA 534 (1973). Significantly, this requirement of
reasonableness exists despite the fact that a soldier is truly in a dilemma when his
orders seem illegal, for disobedience may lead to discharge and imprisonment. 48
CMR at 28. Existence of this qualification indicates that obedience to authority is
never a sufficiently strong policy to justify illegal conduct. If not, then an alternate
basis for the excuse must be found.
This basis seems implicit in the wording of the excuse - the mistake as to
illegality must be reasonable under the circumstances. The only thing distinguishing
the military order from other factors indicating legality are the surrounding
circumstances. Little reason exists for letting the military cases reach the trier of fact
with their excuse and denying a similar defense in other cases.
186. This would be analogous to the test applied to a person in emergency
conditions when sued for negligence. See, e.g., Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.,
27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
187. Barker II, 546 F.2d 940, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
188. See note 142 supra.
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body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense."' 18 9 He claimed the
defense was framed so as to be consistent with the entire "law abidingness"
of the individual and so that the dangers of collusion are minimal. 19° He
found the defense had been deliberately drafted to be a limited defense in
order to promote good faith reliance on official pronouncements with
objective indicia of their reliability, the indicia being the nature of the
official. 91 Having such indicia, he concluded that such reliance became
analogous to reasonable reliance upon a statute, on a judicial decision, or an
administrative order, for all of which the Model Penal Code allows a
defense. 192 Since he concluded that (1) any assertion by Hunt was not an
official interpretation, (2) that Hunt was not in any case charged by law to
make such interpretations, or to administer, or to enforce the law, and (3)
that Hunt had no authority respecting the law defining the offense with
which the defendants were charged, Judge Leventhal felt that the
defendants could not assert a defense of reliance on an official statement of
law.193
Both the discussion of Judge Merhige's opinion and the factors cited by
Judge Leventhal as justifying a defense where there has been reliance on an
official statement as to the legality of certain behavior indicate that the
ultimate basis of this defense is the reasonableness of the reliance.19 1 The
"law abidingness" of the individual is a question that the jury must
ultimately determine, and is indicated by the reasonableness of that
individual's conduct and asserted belief. The likelihood of collusion under
the given circumstances is one of the factors going to the credibility of the
belief, and credibility is a question juries always face. The defense was
drafted to promote good faith reliance on official pronouncements with
objective indicia of their reliability - the official's authority. In fact, such
indicia do nothing more than increase the reasonableness of the reliance on
the authority, and consequently the reasonableness of the belief that no law
was violated. Again, the familiarity of juries with determining reasonableness in tort cases indicates that they should be able to weigh all of the
circumstances surrounding a particular crime and determine the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that he was acting legally. In fact, the jury will
189. 546 F.2d at 968 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 968-69.
192. Id. at 969.
193. Id.
194. A question not treated is whether the dangers of behavior authorized by the
government are so great that no defense should ever be allowed. Article 8 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the document governing the
Nuremberg trials) allowed no such defense, only permitting the order to be considered
in mitigation of punishment. 59 Stat. 1555, 1557, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284
(1945). In actual practice, however, this defense was admitted in some cases. See
WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 300. The apparent general acceptance of at least limited
defenses for government agents indicates that either the consideration of a need for
some obedience to government authority, or considerations of fairness, preclude
disallowing any defense.

1977]

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

be required to do this under the Model Penal Code defense in any case, for
the reliance on the official must be "reasonable." No reason exists for not
trusting the jury with this determination where either the authority was
apparent rather than real, or even where no question of official authority
arises at all. Reliance on an official source of authority merely increases the
likelihood that a belief in the legality of an act was reasonable. A jury will
certainly recognize this, and recognize that its absence makes the defense
much harder to prove.
c.

Mistakes Not Based Upon Official Interpretationsof the Law

Even if Judge Leventhal's criticism of the analogies utilized by Judges
Wilkey and Merhige is justified, it still does not explain why a defense
should not be allowed where the reasonable ignorance or mistake of law is
not based on the assurances of some government figure. His criticism relates
to the dangers inherent in allowing the government in effect to decriminalize otherwise illegal behavior, and this danger does not exist when the
government does not precipitate the ignorance or mistake.
If this distinction is drawn, however, two anomalies develop. First,
people will be unable to rely upon that source of authority whose
information as to the potential illegality of some action should be most
reliable: the enforcer of the law. Second, at least with regard to civil liability,
government officials are frequently provided with some sort of immunity as
long as they are acting within the scope of their authority. The same
dangers against which Judge Leventhal warned exist in these situations. In
fact, the dangers are greater, for the scope of these privileges requires that
the improper actions be cloaked with some apparent legitimacy in that the
official must be acting within the scope of his authority when the illegal
action occurred. Thus, Judge Leventhal wishes to deny a defense to ordinary
citizens relying upon the word of a government official where courts have
held that that official, the true source of danger, may even be immune from
civil liability for his actions. Both of these anomalies indicate that the
distinction between ignorance or mistake based upon some official
interpretation of the law and ignorance or mistake of law derived from some
other source should not be distinguished, and that a defense should be
allowed in both cases.
V.

SUMMARY

This Comment has examined from three perspectives the question
whether an ignorance or mistake of law defense should be allowed. Initially
it asked whether such a defense could be justified and concluded that, at a
minimum, a defense could be justified where an individual lacked the
capacity to act lawfully, and that this capacity did not exist when no
reasonable person would be put on notice of the potential criminality of his
actions, or where this notice was negated by investigation proving to a
reasonable person's satisfaction that his actions were legal. The Comment
next treated the justifications for not allowing a defense. Problems of proof
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asserted by Selden and Austin were found not insuperable. Hall's
justification for disallowing a defense was likewise found inadequate. His
analysis tended to avoid difficult problems by either excluding certain
mistake of law situations from the class of mistakes of law or by carving
exceptions from the rule in some cases where the ignorance or mistake was
reasonable. Holmes' objection to a defense was found to be valid only where
the mistake or ignorance was unreasonable. Finally, analysis of the
opinions in the Barker cases led to the conclusion that the limited defenses
suggested in the opinions were merely examples of mistakes or ignorance of
law where the likelihood of a reasonable mistake was extremely high. Since
determining the reasonableness of conduct is ordinarily a function of the
trier of fact it concluded that this determination should be unfettered in the
absence of some evidence that the capacity of the trier of fact to weigh the
evidence is in some way impaired. No such impairment appearing to exist, it
concluded that a defense should be allowed whenever a reasonable person
would not be on notice of the potential illegality of his action, or having been
put on notice of this potential, and investigated the legality of his intended
action, a reasonable person would conclude that there was no potential that
he would be acting illegally.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Reformulating a rule as ancient as the rule denying a defense for either
ignorance or mistake of law is a task that should be undertaken with
caution, and it is understandable that the judges in the Barker cases limited
the defenses they formulated. Yet, as has been shown, the bases of the rule
are suspect, and inertia should not preserve a rule in a form that has become
archaic. Instead, the defense should be reformulated in terms reflecting
modern concepts of the nature of criminal punishment and of those
195
conditions actually necessary for the criminal justice system to function.
195. An error of law defense has apparently been accepted in West Germany. See
Ryu & Silving, supra note 2, at 450-59. The emphasis, however, seems to be more on
the guilt of the individual than on the individual's intent. Swiss law apparently
required consciousness of illegality for conviction from 1853 to 1937. Id. at 441. The
position presently adopted by Swiss law bears some resemblance to the position
suggested by this Comment. See id. at 444-48, 459-61.

